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2016 INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM JALISCO, MEXICO ROOM 5. 7
DECEMBER 2016. WS143:  How to acknowledge cyber
evidence reform/new parallel law. (the meeting will
begin shortly.  Captioning on the screen). Workshop
5. 9:10:30.30: How to acknowledge cyber evidence:
Reform/new paralle >> We'd like to ask if yes the
audio is working fine.  Just a test.  We have five
more minutes of preparations then we're launching.
Sorry for the delay.

>> Welcome, everybody.  Just a little bit before we start.  Please wait
your turn if you have your turn if you have a question until the microphone
gets to you.  If you have a table microphone, please talk loud to it. Thank
you.  We go on screaming in 30 seconds.

>> JAHANGIR HOSSAIN:  Hello and welcome, everybody.  Thank you for making
it to our workshop entitled "how to acknowledge cyber evidence:  Reform/new
parallel law." What I'd like to first start with is a brief introduction of
the session.

>> KHAN MUHAMMAD FUAD BIN ENAYET:  But before we do that, let me send you
greetings from the session organizers who are unfortunately unable to be
here.  And Jahangir Hossain weren't able to make it.  However, the session
is being organised as you see it.  And we have a set of distinguished
speakers as well as locally here as well as remotely.  Let us start with
the workshop itself and what it an east supposed to do.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  I'm wal idea.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  And the moderator of the session.  I am purely as
an individual.  I'm an ISOC board member but I'm here to help facilitate
and moderate the session. So the workshop itself has several topics and
questions to raise.  The first question is how to address and acknowledge
the cyber evidence where virtual and real life activities should be treated
equally with logical consequences or sequences of happenings and identity
confirmation.  And so that means that how to deal with virtual and real
when it comes to evidence. The second you is whether the modernization
and/or amendment of classical criminal procedure, evidence law, et cetera,
are good enough to manage the Human Rights and criminal activities in
Internet domain.  That is to say the coexistence of real and virtual
domain. The third point is whether the law enforcement activities, for
example, surveillance, intelligence, policing, defense, et cetera, are
going to require separate legal and administrative frameworks.  That is to
say, drafted from scratch to separate the real and virtual domain for the
sustainable ecosystem. And the fourth point is the short-term and long-term
governance model for the Internet, legislature and Internet ecosystem. We
hope we come up with a number of outcomes and recommendations from the
workshop based on the following.  The first is the points/remarks raised by
each of the participants and then we'd like to have recommendations given
by the rapporteurs.  We'd like to also note the importance of the having
counter logic and answers being critical.  And then given by the rap tours.
And then finally, we'd like to have a conclusion that I will be drawing as
the moderator. We have a distinguished set of speakers, some of them were
not able to make it.  But let me start by introducing our first speaker.
He is Sumon Ahmed Sabir, the chief technology officer of fiber at home.  He
also has a couple of other hats.  He's also the Chair of BD Nog.  And he is
also the vice or policy co-Chair of APNIC. So I'd like to bring the
question to him in a straightforward way and ask:  What is your position of
whether there should be cyber laws, parallel laws compared to what we
already have like penal codes and traditional laws in the various sovereign
countries?  And why do you think that is the case?  Thank you.

>> SUMON AHMED SABIR:  Thank you very much, wal idea.  I'm from technical
background.  You heard from Walid.  But we're talking about law.  I worked
with technology and Internet and we feel/felt that we Ned to talk about
it,.

>> MS. TAYO AKINYEMI:  Tully, the way things are moving forward. --
actually. Since Internet became popular in 199 0Zs.  We started we saw
starting from -- and today we can see different kind of online criminal
activities including ransomware, even handicapping your own data and asking
money for that.  Very different kind of crime happening online.  And the
kind -- and what I've seen I think from 2000 or something within different
countries starting to make parallel laws for handling Cybercrime. First law
was made in 200 April it amended three times and last event is now going on
because it does not fit in with the newer kind of challenges you are facing
over Internet.  So from where the question comes that should we go for new
and newer laws for new kinds of crimes?  Or we can really change something
with how we handling the evidences. To my point of view, that any
cumulative activities -- criminal activities, whether it is in cyber world
or real world.  So a criminal should be prosecuted based on the merit of
the crime, not on it is done in the cyber world or in the real world.
Rather, we should focus on the evidence and the merit of the crime done by
the criminals.  So, I'm not in favor of creating new laws all the time;
rather, I'd like to focus on how we can really focus on that evidences,
actually. And creating laws, creating some new problems, as well.  Like I
can give an example.  I'm talking about my country, that like for if you
threat somebody online, then it is proven that in cyber law, it says it can
go up to 70 years of prison with 10 million -- penalty.  But if you do same
thing in another world, the law is not that actually.  So actually you have
been treated differently doing crime in cyber law.  Facebook is of more
challenging than posting something in a newspaper or talking something in a
television. So this kind of discrepancy also we are watching for creating
different laws for handling cyber crimes. And also we found that in some
countries, that the cyber law is being used for kind of operation to the
opposition or some kind of thing.  So it has new kind of laws. Even in our
country, the cyber, if somebody file a case against you using cyber law, it
is not available. So anyway, you have to be at least two to three months to
get bail for high court even though you did nothing.  So these are the
consequences, actually, that we are seeing for having different cyber laws.
Rather, what I like to focus, that every kind of criminal activity has some
kind of evidences.  In civil crime there's civil evidence.  Rather we need
to review this kind of evidence should be recognizable by the court.  So we
need to change the legal system in such a way that it recognizes cyber
evidences. Earlier days in many other countries, we observed that a
videotape or an audiotape is not recognized as evidence because it is not
in paper or some other kind of not physical evidence.  So this changed.  So
we now treat those as evidence in many countries. So we need to focus on
that area.  We need to focus on our legal system.  We need to focus on law
enforcement.  They should be able to handle the cyber evidence.  They
should be able to secure the cyber evidence and produce to the court.  And
the court, judiciary should be aware of how this crime has happened and
acknowledge the evidence and based on the merit of that crime, the criminal
should be prosecuted.  So this is how we can -- creating new para leal
laws, rather we if Ed to acknowledge several evidenced.  I can go in
different evidences.  Not only criminal activities.  Foaks signing a
contract.  In many countries, contract means it has to be on hard paper or
signed.  But now they're talking about digital signature.  We are doing
contracts in digital world by clicking in capture or some type of digital
signature.  And those can be treated as a legal contract.  So from that, we
need to have a new cyber law for contracts; rather, we can add this type of
digital contract as to be recognized.  Purely valid if it is a contract. So
this is the area that I initially try to focus.  Another new area actually
we are focusing and that is that Cybercrime actually is cross-border thing.
It's not limited to a particular nation.  So even if you do have parallel
law, it is a different country.  And if a crime happened from different
country, the law has nothing to do at all.  Rather, in that case, we need
more collaboration. A lot of people are working on that how we can handle
this cross-border Cybercrime.  And we can address this kind of issues.  So
this is not about creating new cyber laws.  So again I think I like to
support the notion that we made several evidence reform, not new parallel
law.  Thank you very much.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  I'd like to summarize quickly the
points that have been raised were. The idea that there should be a law for
every medium is invalid or let's say not practical.  That's what I hear
because a crime is a crime, whether it's committed electronically or in the
real world.  And maybe the reference to the need yum can actually bring us
to the question of whether, for example, there could be a law for telephone
crimes.  For example, you have harassment.  There is no such law because
that is evidence.  You have video, let's say an audio record, then you use
that in the court of law.  And then it leads to a conviction.  It doesn't
mean that you need to have a law for this form of communication.  So it is
the evidence itself and the way you collect that matters, it's not where
and how let's say the crime takes place if that is what I understood
correctly.  No need for new laws for every different form of communication.
So now that we have this particular viewpoint from the technical and
business perspective, and you expected this.  Let me turn to the
government.  Do governments do believe that the cyber laws or necessary or
not?  And I'm really privileged to have here Mr. Andrew from the government
of Congo.  He serves as director for information technology at the ministry
of MEIDECC.  And I'd like to give him the floor now to explain or give his
perspective on this matter.

>> Andrew:  Thank you very much.  As I have been introduced my name is
Andrew do I man an.  I am basically responsible for the ICD and the
domination of srt and I'm very grateful to be here and be part of this
panel discussion. In regards to the question, the government do recognize
the cybersecurity law.  We have been engaged in many activities in
addressing different ways to improve our computer law.  Just a little
background from where I'm at.  Most of you don't know where Doma is.  It is
a small island nation in the south Pacific.  Very close to Fiji and New
Zealand.  And in 2013, we had our fiberoptics landed in Toma.  And that
changed the whole playground for Internet activities in TO ma.  And the
government have addressed the issue of safety in using using the cyber
activities by creating a taskforce, a cyber taskforce.  And this cyber
taskforce had three working groups, which includes cybersecurity, cyber
Cybercrime and cyber safety. And because of this initiative, Toma have
participating on the cultural activities in regards to the (something)
convention.  And as of last month I think November, we have put up our
interest to be an a full member of this Convention which is the I believe
the 51st state to be a member of the Budapest convention. In regards to
carrying a lower form for cybersecurity, we recognize the importance of
this.  As we all know nowadays there are different days that are integrated
or related to any cyber crimes.  One of the important things is when you
get the evidence, there are certain ways of getting those evidence and
preserving it and if you are not doing it right, then it can be argument in
the court of law.  And there is not a valid evidence to be presented.  And
because of that, there are clauses in the laws that need to be in Doma, our
latest act was created in 2003, way before the fiberoptics landed in Doma.
So there is a new cyber law 2016, it's still appealed right now.  But we
are looking at amending that 2003 law to be 2016 act, which raises a lot of
issues that it didn't cover in the 2003. And we are looking forward for
making this law as a baseline for prosecutors.  One thing that we have
learned from the Council of Europe and trying to get ready for the Budapest
Convention is the -- of our charges to understand the different evidence in
Cybercrime.  So there has been some trainings that's been done with the
assistance of Budapest or Council of Europe, basically focusing on
upgrading the prosecutors' knowledge and also the charges.  So when issues
or evidence are presented in a court of law, they would understand better
how these evidences have been apprehended and how it has been contacted
these crimes.  And one thing that we have also noticed, that with
Cybercrime, you don't have to be residence in the country to commit the
crime.  So you could be anywhere.  You could be in America.  You could be
in Brazil or Africa and commit a crime to Doma.  So there are different
aspects in regards to the law.  There needs to be addressed.  When you find
some new evidence that there's been a crime committed in your country.  So
those issues, that's why we are trying to assist, that's why we're
interested in the Budapest Convention because of these international laws
that we need to address because it's very important to us because ever
since that we connected to the fiberoptics, we enable our citizens and also
other citizens from the rest of the world to play in the activities in our
countries in regards to the cyber.  And I think we have come so far to
create this cyber law in Doma, and I think in my opinion that it is a good
thing that we need to evolve, we need to upgrade our laws to match what has
been introduced to the country. As you know, technology evolves really
quickly.  And we need to move forward together with technology.  We need to
understand how this technology can become a problem to our citizens.  One
thing that we also is that the law also point out is how to preserve the
data that has some evidence.  There are right now there's no law that you
can preserve any data, but on a in you law there is a provision that you
can preserve the data or you can seize the data from the -- for those who
are committing the crime, and with the relationship to other laws, we also
need to pine in to some kind of agreement of mutual assistance, agreement
or bilateral so that we can also request for evidence from foreign
countries.  It's very important that those evidence can also be recognized
in our jurisdictions, as well.  And I believe that that's enough for me for
now.  And maybe later on we can elaborate some more.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, Mr. Andrew.  I'd like to summarize
basically what I heard so far.  Basically that cyber criminal activities
have a lot of commonalities.  And the way you provide for, let's say,
collect evidence and gather it and make it, say, bulletproof in the court
of law is that you have to follow certain procedures, certain regulations.
And this has to be enforced by cyber laws so that it can be considered by
the court.  So that is perhaps the gist of what you are referring to. The
other point you noted was the fact that cyber laws can be committed cross-
border, the transnational.  And that reflects on the -- that's because of
the way technology operates. And then you referred to the cyber law in the
context of more broader than sovereign cyber laws is that you have
agreements and cooperations between srts, among srts around the world and
governments coming together and seeing what Bess at proches to tackle cyber
law in a more global aspect.  If that's what I understood. So now you can
see actually you have a split of opinions, which is healthy for a debate.
And the motion that was provided by sum on was against cyber law altogether
and keeping it within the traditional laws that we already have in place.
The second opinion is that we have to establish cyber law and we have to
work on and adapt them and improve them as we can as technology improves.
Now we have a bit of a test of the remote participation to see if we can
get the other speakers who have opted to speak connected.  So if Mr. Bab
you ram Aryal can perhaps let us know if he can begin to speak directly to
the microphone, we can open up if he's muted.  And he is actually the
President for digital equality and very outspoken person with the ICT
community in Nepal in Katmandu. And he's been very active in areas
surrounding access to technology and access to the Internet.  He is also
very active within the Internet Society through the Nepal chapter. Do we
have success in having him connected?  If you can hear us, if you can
speak?

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Can you hear me?

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Yes.  Can we raise the volume a little bit?

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Can you hear me?

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Yes, we can.  Welcome, Babu, the floor is yours.

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Thank you very much, wal idea, and all the colleagues.
At the beginning I missed a little bit but I'm following the discussion.
Directly on the subject matter, Cybercrime is not a different crime.  It is
an extension of traditional crime measure.  So while drafting or while
making new legislation, we need to consider our previous or traditional
evidence laws.  So there are some [Inaudible] of new kind of [Inaudible]
when some technological differences makes some sense of the justice.  For
example, some telecommunication acts are also there and Cybercrime acts are
also there.  And some mediums like SMS and telecom service like mobile are
also there.  They are traditionally governed under the telecommunications
act.  Now with the development of this Internet platform, the importance of
evidence and chain of custody also has become a very different thing.  So
we need a little bit a new thing or new evidence, law in place. But since
we have been discussing about the amendment in government -- Cybercrime
laws, we have been observing many changes in the technology.  But what we
have made a consensus is that if we make any law specific to any
technology, then technology may change in frequent manner.  But changing
law is very difficult.  So while drafting any legislation, we need to go
into the principle rather than about the mediums. So there are a little bit
different mediums, but we need to focus on the principle rather than the
technology alone.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, Babu, for your reflections on this
important matter.  What I understand is that you're not totally against
cyber law nch it's just that you are very much aware of the difficulty in
keeping it up-to-date with the various forms of technologies.  And you have
some sort of skepticism not to the extent of abandoning it but being very
careful in ensuring that the laws do reflect the way that technology is
deployed and used. If that is what you have reflected, then we have a good
balance of opinions.  One for cyber laws by Andrew, the other by Sumon
against cyber law.  And the third is nor in between, that there should be
but there have to be a lot of measures and guarantees that evidence is
there. So let me now allow the audience to chime in with their comments and
opinions and feedback on this important topic.  If you'd like to introduce
yourself and begin to speak within a minute or two, please.

>> Hi, I'm andy Smith, I'm here with the British computer society.  I've
been working with the Internet Society for about 30 years.  I think laws
should be written in such a way that they don't need to keep being changed
and updated.  And that is one of the really big problems with cyber law.
And you've been talking about cyber law rather twhan digital evidence. Now
in the UK, we've got a couple of British standards.  We've got BSI 008
which is about collection of digital evidence.  We now have British
standard 10,08 which is a standard around collection and presentation of
evidence -- 10,008. I think you should be concentrating on generating
international standards around collection and preservation of evidence and
actually get people to understand how to do it properly, especially when it
comes to having immutable evidence, evidence that is hard to challenge in
court.  Because one of the biggest problems you see with criminal cases is
the evidence can be challenged and people can basically show it's not pen
collected properly or the time stamps are wrong or someone could have
changed the audit logs.  So it's really important that organizations,
Internet Service Providers put the time and effort in to make sure that the
information that's collected is of evidencetial quality.  And you can also
trace every action to an accountable individual if it is necessary to do
so. That will also stop a lot of people ending up in court when they
actually had nothing to do with it. So I think there is really a need to
concentrate on standards, especially international standards, and move away
from trying to put everything into law when technology and the whole
Internet changes so quickly.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you for your important comment.  It may add
to the notion that cyber law is not necessary perhaps if that is -- you're
not absolutist in that but you do not favor it.

>> We've had cyber law.  I mean, we've had it since 1991.  And the laws
keep getting updated and bits keep getting added.  But technology's
changing way too fast for policymakers and legislators to keep up.  So
you're always going to -- if you try and put too much in the law and too
much detail, you are going to end up with ways around it and you're
basically going to give the defendant loopholes to I don't.  It's of better
-- to use.  It's much better to concentrate on having good strong laws.
And I do agree that the laws should be equal whether it's in the physical
world, real world, or cyber world.  And then concentrate on getting
actually the evidence to prosecute properly.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you very much.  We have another comment from
the audience here.

>> Thank you, Alexander Siegel from Council of Europe and I particularly
thank the representative from Domais for his presentation. When you talk
about law, we have to substantiate between the part, what did you fine as
what conduct you define as crime and the procedural law.  And I have a
question to the first speaker.  How would you address a denial of service
attack through traditional law?  Keeping in mind 16 years after the "I love
you" bug attack from the Philippines where the spreading of that bug, of
the virus was not a crime in the Philippines.  And the student who caused
hundreds of millions of dollars of damage around the world went free
because it was not a crime.  So keep that in mind.  The procedural law is
another story.  Keep in mind again that when government searches computers,
collects evidence, this is a strong interference with the rights of
individuals.  And this interference is only possible if it is clearly
defined and prescribed by law. Again, you have to go back to the law and
define it very clearly.  It's a fundamental principle of the Rule of law.
We have here again the dilemma that traditional law is difficult to apply
by analogy.  You may have traditional law for searching of a house.  You
give it to the judge to search the house, all the safeguards that are
there.  Searching a computer system is is a completely different story.
And in particular as the representative of Tonga said then you come to the
conclusion of evidence, yeah you may enter in this computer but the
evidence may be another jurisdiction.  You have to regulate it in one way
or the other.  And that's why happy that Tonga is soon a part of the
Budapest Convention because we are now going to negotiate solutions of how
can we get to this other, how can we regulate, get clear rules of access to
evidence in the cloud computing context. But again. The clarification to
first speaker, Bangladesh, you had an interesting case, bank robbery via
Internet.  How would you resolve this if it's not addressed in substantive
criminal law? Just one more comment to the intervention by the
representatives of the UK there, yeah, you cannot change -- changing
criminal law is very complicated.  Very difficult.  You may be able once
every three, four years to go to parliament with that.  You cannot go every
three months.  There has been a new technique, a new type of Cybercrime
comes up. When you look at the conduct in the Budapest Convention, the 9
offenses defined in the Budapest Convention, that covers in combinations
almost everything you still need today.  The parties to the Convention
every now and then issue guidance notes saying how can you apply the
Budapest Convention to address denial of service attacks, bought
necessities, crucial -- identity theft, terrorism, knowledge offenses that
are not defined in the laws itself but you can use combination o of
offenses.  So we have to be technology-neutral so we don't have to change
it; but when it comes to the procedural law, you have to keep it up-to-date
all the time otherwise you don't meet the basic Rule of law principle.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you for your important comment.  I'd like to
ask if we have one more comment and then come back to the panel for another
round.

>> Hello.  My name is Victor Benavides from the Dominican Republic.  Here
we are talking about Internet Governance.  And here is about the cyber
evidence and penal law.  And I have a question.  Do you think that strict
cyber law in many countries to regulate the crime, the crime, can affect
the governance of Internet because the government regulate the crime alone.
They don't ask to civil society, to the multistakeholder who participate in
Internet Governance.  Do you think that this strict every e lance can
affect the governance of Internet?

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  We'll have first the response and take
another round of discussions.  And also if there are any remote
participants raising your hands, you can also keep us informed. So a few
comments from the panel.

>> Yeah, thank you.  The questions how we could handle digital attack
without law.  To me, digital attack means I'm doing a service.  And
somebody interrupted somehow and I have been stopped from doing the
service.  Delivering packets or whatever it is.  But again same thing that
could happen in physical world.  I am providing service.  Put garbage in
front of my shop and cannot open my shop.  This is criminal an offense.  I
think normal law can handle this kind of situation provided we have to
reform the evidence that I have attack in the civil world, sending this
type of packet.  And court should see that it actually stopped my service.
So that kind of I'm talking about.  We don't have to have type of law in
digital world that it happen in cyber world.  I don't think we need to have
any para leal law for handling that.  Rather we need to accept new kind of
evidence in the cyber world that can be produce today the court.  That is
my one point. And secondly getting that cross-border effort like mentioned
the bank robbery happened in Bangladesh from other countries, mostly money
went to Philippines.  And before going on, how to resolve that.  Again,
Bangladesh we have a cyber law.  And for this kind of crime.  But it cannot
be applied in Philippines from what the crime is for.  We need kind of
collaboration on that.  And globally I really like the point by the
gentleman who interrupted first that we have international standards about
criminal evidence so that all the court would recognize clearly in all the
countries.  That is the most significant thing in terms of handling
Cybercrime. The law handling Internet Governance.  But in my point of view
yes in some cases it is true actually because some harsh civil law may --
cyber law may create issue on free expression and many other laws like
maybe if you look at Cybercrime law in different countries, you will find
valid questions on that actually hampering that governance.  That's my
personal point of view.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Since your name was referenced, Andrew, before,
we'd like to comment on the discussion?

>> Andrew:  Thank you.  I'd just like to point out like to the gentleman
from UK, you have pointed out believe there shouldn't be any additional.
What we are trying to stop this in Doma is to establish one.  You have
mentioned that in the UK you already have a cyber law.  We do believe that
we should have a cyber law and then like me like the comment before, we
stop this and then we can amend it as it needed.  As we going through the
exercise of developing our law, we have identified so many shortfalls in
the procedural powers in apprehending that evidence.  And so we added some
more class to develop a more stable law that can assist in the court of
law. I still think it's very important for us to look at even though the
technology was really fast, we also need to identify a baseline where we
can work on just like the mention from the Council of Europe.  They have
developed a baseline that has been there for a while.  And it's been not
applied.  It covers most of the cases that need to be addressed.  And we
also don't believe that but he wanted to develop the baseline and he can
always refer to. In regards to that question from that gentleman relating
to other organizations, it's also from the interest of our government and
also and is probably true from other governments that the reference to
other organizations just like Council of Europe.  We also when we develop
our cyber law, we also learn from other countries like Sri Lanka.  Those
similar environments that we establish a good relationship with them and
also learn from them on how they prosecute their Cybercrime.  And we also
added some values to our law based on their perspectives. And I think at
the end of the day, we really need to have something on the baseline.  So
later on we can add on.  We can add on like it's been mentioned.  It's not
easy to change the law every three months. But if you have something solid
on the baseline, you can always relate to add on new to the law to what
make it more appealing or focused on how to prosecute the criminals.  As
the criminals are getting smarter every day, they find new ways of
intruding to your personal properties or personal life, we need to address
those.  And I think some of the -- cannot really define how to prosecute
those who are committing law via cyber.  And I think by looking at
different ways of amending those laws, it will also help them in the court
of law.  Wham wal thank you, Andrew.  Before going to another round of
comments.  I want to check if Babu has additional intervention as panelist.
Babu would like to respond to comments?

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Yes, Walid, I'd like to make a couple comments.  As I
already mentioned, we need to focus on more principle rather than
technology or any medium.  But this electronic mediums are electronic
evidence that they are more vulnerable for compromise.  So we need to have
certain level of legislative practice on this area, how to protect this
kind of evidence rather than judging about the -- based on the content.  So
if -- in courts they have interpreted traditional evidence based on the
principle of evidence or impact of that thing to any crime. So we need to
that to level of legislative part.  One is evidence in the law practice.
There are certain substantive things and certain -- thing.  So first
outstanding thing if the traditional Rule of best evidence law/principle
and for procedural law, maintaining the evidence, we can have more
developed, new -- evidence.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, Babushings.  We will now move to another
round of comments.  I realise there are several who would like to comment.
The lady?  Also any remote participations.  Also remote participant,
please.

>> Just a comment from June Tessi, IGF ISOC fellow.  So her comment says as
a counsel they we are also reviewing our Cybercrime law.  And I agree that
there is a need for review and constant update.  I think we need both
reform and new laws.  The traditional law did not foresee certain current
trends just as Mr. Alexander from the EU council said.  And there is a need
to provide it in law in order to affect prosecution.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you for that comment, Jun.  Yes, please?

>> My name is Lawrence.  I'm IGF Fellow.  I have a question.  How does the
government handle the Rule of encryption when collecting cyber or digital
evidence?  And how can the technical community come to sort of aid in this?

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  We'll take another couple comments before we go
back.  Yes, please.

>> Good morning.  Thank you for your presentations.  My name is Patricia
Vargas.  I'm a PhD candidate Vera cruise university.  Kind of followup what
the representative of the Council of Europe mentioned.  Initial between
substantial and procedural law there is a distinction between local and
international law.  Academics call the cyberspace a perplexity for the
international law because there's no recognition of the traditional borders
of the nation states.  So with the nation states come the issue of
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction in what a crime is state B may not be a
crime in nation of state C.  There are also differences in encryption
policies.  For instance, so in the Budapest Convention itself helps because
it gives some kind of framework for the members of how to address these
issues.  But when you talk about collaboration -- because we may have
multiple nation states involved in a crime.  What would be the main
elements for this potential collaboration?  Because we are talking about
different legal systems, different legal cultures, different ways of
searching, et cetera, et cetera.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  Were there any other comments at the
back?  And then we can come to you.  And then there's also one remote
participant.

>> So I'll just give you a quick example of where I'm coming from with
this.  I bring you or bring in something slander comments.  You want to
take me to court to slander.  Do you use a different law if I running you
using GSM or Skype from the same phone? And more importantly, can you prove
it was me? That's what it really comes down to.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Very strong point, yes, indeed.

>> Luis, BCS-- for IT.  I think one of the important differences that
hasn't been raised yet between some Cybercrime and some "conventional
crime" if I can call it that.  Is the question of scale.  If we take the
example of DDOS versus putting garbage outside a single person's shop, both
of them prevent people going about their lawful business, which is probably
illegal in the country and cross-border, let's just stay in one country. I
think the difference that perhaps needs to be considered -- and I'd like
the panel's opinion on -- is:  Should the -- is the thing that needs to be
changed not the underlying law but the range of things that you can do to
-- if you find the person who's done it -- to stop them because one affects
many more people and is perhaps more serious.  And maybe your law before
said you could only fine a person loss of one day's service for one person;
whereas it should be a of bigger fine or maybe -- much bigger fine or
perhaps a civil sentence, it should go from civil to criminal law because
of the scale of what you can do in so the cyber world.  So I'd just like
your view on that.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  There is a remote participant who
wanted to add a comment.

>> Jun:  Yes there is followup comment from the earlier remote participant
June.  She says the problem we have seen with blanket alteration of the
traditional criminal legislation, at least in Kenya, is that there's
created loopholes in wide interpretation and excessive abuse of power by
our state agencies.  There's therefore a need for specialised Cybercrime
law.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, June.  Yes, please.

>> This is Mohid from Internet Society chapter.  First of all, many thanks
for your presentation.  I think it's important that we have this sense of
diversity in the Forum where people debate about:  Is cyber law really
required to properly cope with the challenges we are facing in the current
world? My question to the panel is about two things.  One is about cyber
disarm amount because there has been increased talks about cyber
disarmament because all the nation states have been affected.  And there
are some things which are in the challenge of jurisdiction.  So this has
been talks in the Forum of Budapest Convention and otherwise also about
cyber disarmament. So is cyber disarmament somewhere related to cyber law?
That's one of my questions. Andy forgot the second one.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  That's more time.  If it's a pressing comment?
Yes?  Go ahead.

>> Everything is pressing, no? [Laughter] Just to this last one because
refers to Budapest Convention.  Budapest Convention is not a treaty about
the states, state to state Phil Terry criminal, it is a criminal law treaty
only.  Of course it can help if you can deal with interstate relations if
you can deal with it as a criminal justice matter rather than putting it to
national security measure. But something to keep in mind about the issue of
electronic evidence.  Most of the offenses investigated these days by
criminal justice authorities have an element of electronic evidence without
it being Cybercrime.  Kidnapping, terrorists communicating with each other,
extortion, whatever.  Element of electronic evidence.  You have to keep in
mind probably 99 percent of cases that I investigated -- are not Cybercrime
but are traditional crime.  We have to keep that in mind. We also have to
keep in mind that all charges, all prosecutors, all law enforcement would
rather sooner or later come across electronic evidence.  Large that touches
criminal charges altogether. I agree with the first speaker in some ways;
namely, that it is a mistake if you put every new technique that cyber
criminals use into the criminal law.  It's impossible.  Don't put a
substantive law in place that talks about phishing or pharming or bot
attacks.  I've seen some of the laws I mention in countries because we get
lots of draft laws to review from around the world that you have for one
offense, in the Budapest Convention takes about 3 or 4 lines which some
countries have implemented that it works, that in some countries you have
25 different paragraphs on the same offense of criminal access to this,
criminal with the intent to do that, criminal against government computers
so on and so on.  That's a mistake.  DDOS attacks can be covered by system
interference as it is defined in the Buddha test Convention, it is five
lines.  So you don't need to update the laws every three weeks if a new
technique comes up have keep it neutral.  Keep it simple.  Use the Budapest
Convention.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  I may want to abuse my role as the
moderator and pose my open enrollment question before anyone else does.  Is
that have you not felt that some governments, it's not a blanket
assumption, some governments have abused cyber law to prosecute bloggers,
prosecute journalists and prosecutes several civil society activists on the
basis of the committing a crime? And in fact they may use the scale aspect
and say they've done of bigger damage to national security than other
regular crimes? So keeping that in mind, isn't that the case in some
countries?  And how can one deal with it?

>> Absolutely.  I was on a panel in I think it was the Nairobi IGF.  And we
discussed after the panel I discuss Wednesday the person next to me.  It
was a blogger from a Middle East country, he said "I was blogging critical
to the government.  Under the criminal law, the government couldn't do
anything against me.  But then the same day they declared me a threat to
national security and that's how I ended up in prison and being tortured."
So let's keep it in mind.  We need criminal law.  We need to have it
clearly defined with all the safeguards in it.  We have to bring as of as
possible within the realm of criminal law and not give governments the
possibility to work in a different arena, the national security arena where
all these protections don't apply.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Do you have something quick?  Very quickly, please.

>> I wanted to add.  I just remember what I wanted to ask.  So I wanted to
ask about is concealing any potential Cybercrime by one nation state is
also a crime in another? So, for example, if you want to take an example of
heartbeat where NSA was knowing about these vulnerabilities which can be
potentially used to attack some other nation state, so is concealment of
those kind of activities also be considered as Cybercrime in the law?

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Good.  So many questions and different ways of
looking at it.  But perhaps I can start the other way around, with Andrew,
perhaps.  There were several provocative questions including ones about how
to use Skype or GSM device and how we differentiate?  Do you have any
responses to those questions?

>> Andrew:  Thank you.  I'll just try to remember all the questions.  But
let's start with this question.  I think it's very important that we have
some kind of mutual understanding or bilateral understanding with other
countries. In regards to Skype, you all know Skype is hosted somewhere
else, possibly in the United States.  We have similar cases in Doma where
people do defamation through Facebook.  And the police, they report it to
the police.  The way they have to do it is to ask Facebook to bring down
the account. Because of Facebook, they have also have policies in place for
privacy.  So you can't ask them who it is unless you go through the legal
process in the United States where you and launch to -- what happened is a
threat to national security?  Or committing crime in your country?  There
is a way of going through it, mutual legal assistance where you can launch
a complaint through the Department of Justice in America and they launch a
court order.  So in that way, you can bring down and identify if that
evidence is sufficient enough.  And I think it applies to something of that
degree of what you just said. If you talk on Skype and it's proven that
it's some terrorist nature, to our country, we can make that arrangement to
identify the person.  That's the beauty of interconnecting with other
jurisdictions in regards to this.  And that's reflected in our new cyber
law also that we need to address those things.  With the encryption data.
As you may know, we're starting our cert(?  Srt?) when there's encryption
data coming through and there needs to be decrypt, is that what the
question is all about?  The question was?

>> When collecting cyber evidence, the aspect of inscription, there is
already encryption, how does it play?  Or what's the effect of encrypted
data in relation to evidence collection?

>> Andrew:  Okay.  There are different ways that addressed those issues.
And I think there are mechanisms that they can decrypt data and also store
those.  Encryption data is also -- there's procedures that need to be
followed.  In order for that data to be presented as evidence in court.
Because if you are to tempt, to try to decrypt any encryption data in some
ways that it will alter the data, it won't be recognized in the court of
law.  So there are certain ways and procedures that need to be accounted
for.  And follow through in order for you to deal with that kind of data.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Now to Sumad, you had the bulk of the questions.

>> SUMON AHMED SABIR:  After the discussion of all the audience here, I
think the question already answered have and we have a very clear view
about that.  Again, even so, first my apology, I'm not lawyer, actually.
I'm not expert in legal.  I'm more of technological person, technology.
Sometimes came to us and we need to handle this in that regard, discussions
came to my mind that while we are -- law rather we need to empower, we need
to ensure Hans the ability of our law enforcement agencies or legal systems
so that we can measure, we can address the Cybercrime evidences.  We need
to measure on the degree of the crime, the impact on the people.  If it is
single individual or it is impacting a large community.  So other crimes or
in physical world, that needs to be measured based on the evidence.  It is
important how correctly, how effectively we can guide the evidence and the
Code and the court give justice more.  That is more important than creating
new laws, thats my point of view, actually.  Apart from that I think.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  You had questions about the effect that perhaps 99
percent of cyber criminal laws are actual real laws, any.  Yeah,.

>> SUMON AHMED SABIR:  Yeah, maybe, using the Internet or technology.  But
it is essentially something, some criminal law real world, actually.  So
the same law can actually apply.  That's what I believe.  And I believe
that's very doable.  Another point you mention, Skype call or GSM call.  It
may happen that I come to you and tell you that we need to do this crime
together.  Or I can use eye use pigeon to send a letter to you.  Doesn't
matter what kind of crime we have done through that.  If it is that,
important thing that government should need to identify that it is me or we
have done this crime.  So that is more important than creating laws for
different technology for different method.  Maybe new technology come in
the future.  So we need to focus on the laws, rather than focus on how
things happen.  Actual fact.  Actual evidences and that should be created
equally.  And discuss the international boundary actually that I don't have
answer how to do that properly, but I think we altogether work to that,
that if criminal actual happen cross-border, maybe different countries
involved in that, how we can work together, some ongoing problem and
discuss you all are having.  I think we need to work on it together.  I
don't have anything else to that.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Maybe if I could reflect on the last point.  There
are laws that actually deal, real laws that deal with cross-border issues,
for example, smuggling, you have money laundering, you have aspects
regarding global economy.  So there are ways to deal with it.  But again to
come back to the point of the baseline.  There cannot be a way to ensure
that every single crime in the format on type needs a separate law.  I mean
that's ludicrous.  No one here argues for this.  But perhaps you have to
have some kind of disagreement, some kind of agreement that there are
certain things that can be put into a cyber law and then there's still the
view that even that is not necessary.  Let us take Babu, and then come back
for last round of comments.

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Thank you.  I have a couple of examples of issues of
this platform or this kind of law, cyber laws you just mentioned before.
In any Pál, there are recording of Supreme Court hearing and the municipal
court charge that person -- Cybercrime case, which is absolutely different
regarding -- posting is not Cybercrime.  And that was taken by the court
though he won the case but it was absolutely -- posting in that kind of
case. Another case was Nepal police published one their good attempt of
defending law and order.  But one comment by the citizen was that and they
didn't do this without any bribe.  So police charged that person based on
cyber terrorism.  So there are issues that apart from and this in aggregate
is more severe than traditional platform.  If it is definition under our
traditional law, punishment is just like -- but in this cyberspace, it goes
up to five years.  So based on the technology, we should -- we should not
treat differently.  You just mention that there are certain laws, certain
crimes which are in traditional format.  For example, binding recovery we
covered earlier this discussion, there are certain kind of tools, krobbers
or criminals are using to transfer money in the bank but actually that is
transfer of money which is also a crime in traditional law.  So we need to
balance these kind of things.  This is my perception.  We need to balance
offline and traditional evidence.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, Babufrom holding the stick from the
middle, I guess. Let's move on to the last round of comments because we are
about to finalise.

>> I want you to keep in mind because reference was made to the
international nature of the crimes or of the evidence.  Create difficulties
getting international cooperation by another country if the dual criminals
done that is not met.  Which means if you don't have something -- if there
is a denial of service attack against Bangladesh and your offense comes
from Tonga, but Tonga says that type of interference is not a crime, they
would not cooperate with Bangladesh because criminality is not met. And
pornography issues, not talking about child pornography, pornography is a
crime in some countries but not others.  It is difficult for Europe to get
cooperation from United States with hate speech and xenophobia and that
kind of thing. So you need something in your domestic law to obtain
cooperation from other country.  And again the type of conduct that is in
the Budapest Convention, that's internationally agreed.  If you put it into
law, you get cooperation.  If you don't put it in law you don't get
cooperation from another country. On the issue of the severity of
penalties, sometimes it's more severe in cyber environment than not, indeed
it has often to do with the impact it has.  I think the garbage in front of
the shop is a very good example to that.  There are only a few crimes in
the Budapest Convention which are crimes committed by means of computers.
Like the nature of child pornography has changed in the online environment.
The impacts, the negative impact has changed a lot in the online
environment compared to real life when you had to send some around by posts
and now you spread ity by Internet.  Similarly the type of fraud have
changed a lot.  There are a lot of fraud that you don't have in real life.
In real life you have to deceive the mind of a person to be fraudulent.
Now to deceive the computer, the man in the middle attack, in some
countries that would not be a crime.  In Germany it was not a crime until
they ratified the Budapest Convention.  Now two-thirds of the crimes in
Germanry crimes because of the Budapest Convention, it was not a crime
before.  And so forth.  You have to keep that in mind, as well.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you.  Anymore comments?  Remote participants?

>> Again, comment from June.  I think it goes back quite far back.  So what
the Chair said earlier, please refer back to comments several times ago,
has actually been seen in Kenya, in other words, abuse of law on
Cybercrime.  The effect of that, however, upon chal enbefore the court was
that the law was declared unconstitutional.  So that was her comment.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Good.  So now we approached the last 10 minutes of
the workshop.  And perhaps I'd give the panelists a few minutes each to
round up their comments and bring in the strongest points to persuade
whoever is not yet persuaded.  And then finally I'll just give a very short
summary and conclude.

>> Thank you, Walid.  I agree with the comment made last example.  I just
forgot, actually.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Of the laws having to be there?  National?

>> Right.  And the Budapest Convention is actually important that all the
countries should agree. It is not debating that creating laws are different
kind of situation we're debating, but practically we need to solve the
problem actually that Cybercrime is a real issue and crime coming to the
Internet being used.  Even we got report of this kind of complaint to
police and say that my -- is lost.  He bought it paying money physical loss
and that has been snatched by somebody and told police to get that.  So
that is also happening.  So we're living in both physical world and cyber
world.  So things are getting more and more difficult to divide us.  So we
need to act sensibly and effectively so that in future we can get a safer
and better Internet.  For that we need to all work together.  And I really
want to thanks all the different comments for supporting me.  But all very
important.  Then again come to decision.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  That's sportsmanship we like.  Thank you.  Andrew?

>> Andrew:  First of all, I would like to thank you for all the comments
made.  And thank you for your contributions, especially for the Council of
Europe, for the kind of enlightenment in a lot of issues that we have
discussed today. From the government point of view, especially from my
government, the bottom line is that it is the best interest of any
government, including Doma, that the issue of safety of our citizens is the
most important thing.  And that's why we looking to different laws
including the cybersecurity law because as I was mentioning before, we just
knew -- the case with the fiberoptics to Tofga.  And there's a big form in
the using of technology.  According to our system right now, there's not
many cases reported.  But in our assessment, there's been cases happening
in Tonga.  But the problem is they're not aware of what's going on.  And
they never get it reported or recorded because they didn't really know that
what's going on.  It's something can be classified as a crime. Putting up
the new law, it really defined what considered as defined and what is
considered as crime and also have some more definition to it.  And it
really helps our prosecutors, our judges to really understand activities
going on throughout cyberspace.  And I would like to recognize the an
assistant from Council of Europe in that regards because they have
contributed a lot in developing the laws for Tonga in regards to
Cybercrime.  And we have come across a lot of issues that we have now
recognized that needs to be addressed, probably.  And also looking into the
future, we'll hope that we will create something that will better serve our
citizens as well not only for our country only but also provide any mutual
assistance to any other countries that we can interact with through the
Budapest Convention.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, and drew.  And perhaps the last word by
analyst Babu would like to say something.

>> BABU RAM ARYAL:  Thank you, Walid.  Major thing in this evidence lesson
is that we need to recognize the format of the medium of -- in many --
traditionally they require, for example, document is the only document
which is in paper.  So now we have the documents in electronic or digital
form.  So we need to recognize the evidence or content rather than
interpreting totally differently. We need to emphasize the impact of any
act or any tools rather than -- And second part I'd like to say that
cooperation, national international is different thing when talking about
the evidence.  Evidence is basically a fact.  Rather than interpretation.
Many laws whether it is crime or not is interpretation.  But evidence is a
fact.  So evidence are basically it's universal.  Need to recognize
universal these things.  And then only you can prosecutor we can have
better Cybercrimelessness.  Thank you.

>> DR. WALID AL-SAQAF:  Thank you, Babu.  So let me try to take the hard
task of summarizing what we've been through.  It looks like there is more
or less, I am sorry to say, Sumon, majority were calling for keeping cyber
law and having it there.  However, there was also agreement with you on the
need to not take things to the extremes, to the details, to the level that
makes cyber law not possible to implement. It is one thing to ensure that
there is something, some baseline, some commonalities, common ground that
everyone can agree with, which would foster international collaboration and
fighting Cybercrime.  But on the other hand, some countries as earlier
mentioned may take it to the extreme either too the ecosystem inicly by
elaborating on things, maybing laws very difficult to make laws to continue
to evolve and sometimes to sue protocol east citizens to suppress dissent.
And in some cases cause more harm than good.  But if you think of in in
terms of the benefit of society at large, the benefit of citizens, keeping
them safer, then having some sort of guidance there that's uniform, that's
standard, that's based on digital evidence, good practices is very useful
and it can be elaborated more and clarified in ways that help society at
large. The points that have been raised on various subjects from the
different tools used to collect evidence, the technicalities, procedural
things, these are lower in some -- they're not laws, per se.  So they need
to be taken into account.  However, there's something that I felt was a bit
missing in this discussion, which was the competence of the ones, law
enforcements and evidence collectors and judiciary systems and injuries and
everyone, competence understanding what is going on in the Internet, cyber
evidence, what are we dealing with?  This has been mentioned in different
workshops, in different events.  And that's why there were capacity
building programmes for individuals from lawyers, to judges, to civil
servants, to police forces to understand how the Internet is shaping our
world and making us a need for these come pep tenses and abilities.  And so
it's very complex workshop and the topic is complex.  The ideas that have
been floating around are very much ingrained bodes as citizens and
governments and law enforcement units as well as technologists and lawyers.
But on the other hand, it's still promising that we have a way to debate
this openly, fairly in a sense of sportsmanship and spirit of understanding
that we can disagree but eventually it's the interests of the end user that
matters. So we are two minutes earlier than our time.  Thank you for coming
here.  I'd like to give a special round of applause for the panelists.
[CHEERS AND APPLAUSE] And for you.  And for the remote moderator, thank you
very much for helping us.  And we hope you enjoy the rest of the day.
Thank you. (end of session)  10:45-12:15. WS208: Ip cluInclusive responses
to intentional Internet disruptions.

>> Can you hear me?  Hello, everyone.  We'll start in about two minutes.

>> MODERATORHello, everyone.  Thanks for joining us this morning.  So this
is in case you're in the wrong spotted, this is a panel, a work shot about
intentional disruptions to the Internet.  And it's a workshop format. So
we'll begin with quick remarks from the plenary from our panelists here and
we'll break up into two workshops.  After that we'll reconvene and talk
about the lessons we've learned. So we've been access now, the organisation
I work for, we've recorded more than 50 intentional disruptions to the
Internet by governments around the world.  We expect -- we actually believe
that the number is far higher than that.  That's an extremely conservative
estimate.  And we've seen that Human Rights violations and Internet
shutdowns go hand-in-hand, meaning that when governments order and disrupt
the Internet, which can include social media applications, people live in
-- are shrouded in darkness, they're unable to communicate with their
friends, they can't talk to family, emergency services are disrupted, and
as you'll hear there's also aer economic impact -- severe economic impact.
Several of the panelists here we're very lucky to have people from various
stakeholders, we have people from government, from countries, from civil
society, we have people in the room who have been directly impacted by
Internet shutdowns.  So we hope that that will make for fertile
conversation during our workshops. Just want to start out by explaining a
few great things that have happened this year.  One is there was a human
lights council resolution that unequivocally condemned Internet shutdowns.
We had a straight statement by the global initiative that you'll hear from
shortly.  And there was an important statement by the GSm. association.
We've also had progress in other areas. At Access Now, we are involved and
spearhead the Keep It On campaign which has 150 organizations from many
countries, many impacted by shutdowns.  And this year we've also joined
with creative partnership with the partner called lush, a cosmetics company
to raise awareness about shutdowns.  And we launched a campaign with a very
special bath product that launched in 40 countries, six languages and
nearly 1,000 stores around the world to tell people about Internet
shutdowns. We also invited people to take action to show that this is a
practice that needs to stop.  And you're looking at it right here.  This is
the action.  This is a thousand pages of signatures of people who are
committed around the world to keeping the Internet on.  So we're going to
deliver this message later today. So I'll turn now to -- and after this,
after we have these brief introductory remarks, we'll have another
discussion.  So we'll open it up for questions before going to the breakout
group just in case you have any burning questions.  So we'll turn now to
Judith Lichtenberg from the global initiative to talk about their
societies.

>> It's great to talk about your coordinated efforts with lush.  My New
Year's Eve bought the bath bombs.  I didn't know what it was until they
happy to know they are like it.  And I am happy to give it to them and
relate it to network shutdowns. The network shutdowns have been named as
one of the issues.  We have been concerned with government shutdowns
already for a long time since the complete shutdown of the Internet in
Egypt in 2011.  But what was then almost an unprecedented step has now
become ultra frequent. We know that national laws allow governments to take
control of communications during a national emergency.  And we also
acknowledge that the protection of national security and public safety are
legitimate government concerns, but having said that, network shutdowns and
disruptions are very drastic measures.  And they often risk to be
disproportionate in their impact.  So they cannot only have serious
consequences for the Freedom of Expression but also for a whole range of
other economic and social rights and economic development.  And DJ gave
already a couple of examples of about. The good news is that awareness has
grown.  Diverse voices have spokep up against network shutdowns.  But I
think an important question now is what are the next steps to prevent and
mitigate network shutdowns?  It's a question for all of us. And in any
case, it is a problem that cannot be solved by companies, governments or
civil society alone; it really requires a sustained multistakeholder
collaboration. And I want to conclude with two comments.  First of all, we
believe that it is critical that all stakeholders, including governments,
are not seeing network shutdowns only through security lens but also
through a Human Rights and economic development lens.  And that requires
education of and also engagement with governments and their agencies. And,
secondly, in terms of engagement, it's very good to keep in mind that the
window for engagement is before network shutdowns are issued.
Telecommunication companies operating on the ground in challenging
jurisdictions and in the middle of a crisis will have very limited options
to respond at the moment their local staff is confronted with a government
order. So this discussion is very timely indeed, and we look forward to the
results of the beakout sessions.  Thank you.  And I now give the floor to
Dgigi.  My name is Gigial ferd.  I work at the United States Department of
State at the bureau of democracy Human Rights and labour.  Thank you for
the remarks before.  I think this is obviously very important panel and
great panelists to talk about this. . As many of you know, the United
States has been speaking out increasingly about our concerns and taking
steps to condemn measures by state actors to intentionally prevent or
disrupt access to or dissemination of information online in violation of
international Human Rights law.  So essentially this is what government-
backed disruption of mobile and Internet networks does. This is something
is articulated in the U.S. strategy for cyberspace that was issued in 2011,
which speaks in support of an Internet that's global, open, secure and
reliable. And living in fear that the Internet will be shut down or that
mobile services will be blocked disrupts that trust in the Internet. So I
think I've been asked to speak specifically, along with a colleague here,
about the increasing trend of disruptions of Internet mobile services
around elections.  And this is, I think, one sort of case study that needs
to be analyzed because it locks at the motivations of governments behind
doing this. And so when we speak about the economic argument for keeping
the Internet on when we talk about the Human Rights argument for keeping it
on, analyzing how to work with governments ahead of potentially planned
shutdown along these issues requires a little bit of getting into the
psychology of wanting to stay in power, wanting to make sure an election is
peaceful because these are concerns that we know are often behind some of
these sensitive times.  And so something that just can't be treated in the
abstract.  It's important to understand these tendencies. Elections and
protests are times that we've seen it.  We know that this violates
international Human Rights obligations and can run counter to Human Rights
commitments.  So reminding governments of those commitments is definitely a
first step. Making sure that they understand that these types of
restrictions are not provided for by law, and that they're not the least
restrictive measure for achieving what in some cases might be legitimate
government interests such as the protection of national security.  So
making sure that you're coming to the table with alternative viewpoints of
what can be done to try to address these times of transition and political
sensitivity because unless there are other options on the table, that
extreme measure tends to be what governments will go to. So to give a
little sense of where the U.S. has been engaging on these issues over the
past six months to a year, we were really pleased to join consensus on the
Human Rights Council resolution in June of 2016, which unequivocally
condemned these intentional measures to disrupt free flow of information.
This is also something we're engaging with the Freedom Online Coalition to
speak jointly with other governments on these issues.  The more and more
the trend grows, the more it becomes normalised.  That's something that the
Human Rights Council resolution statement tried to do, was to push the norm
back towards the assumption that once the Internet is turned on in a
country, that it will stay on.  And making the Human Rights legal case for
that and kind of adding to the voices that are making the economic
argument, which is important, but kind of this bigger picture. In addition
to co-sponsoring that, this was something that in October the Freedom
Online Coalition conference spoke to quite frequently.  There were panels
to discuss this and a decision by all 30 members of the F. O. C. to issue a
joint statement speaking on network shutdowns.  Now, what will the join
statement say in addition to what's already been said in the Human Rights
Council resolution?  This is something that we're hoping to work closely
with private industry, with civil society, with academia to understand what
can be said beyond that normative statement, how to take it to a new level
of political commitments and operationalization. So there's been support
from our assistant secretary for democracy, Human Rights and labour, Tom
malinowski.  He wrote a blog post speaking to some of the concerns the U.S.
has about the trend and calling on governments to make commitments not to
engage in these measures.  And I'm happy to say that there were examples of
good news to report.  So at the end of the blog post, our secretary did
mention the example of Ghana.  And so I'm happy to turn the microphone over
to Kenneth Adu Amanfu, who is the deputy director for ICT and the Ghanaian
national communications agency to speak a little bit the experience there.
Thank you.

>> Yes, thank you, Elizabeth.  Yes.  I think in this era where almost
everything that we do -- hello.  I'm sure you can hear me now.  In this
area, almost everything that we do is generally migrating to the Internet.
I mean, we cannot afford to have the Internet shutdown.  Heat me just speak
about the experience in Ghana.  A couple of months ago, the police chief
issued an order that the Internet was going to -- or the network was going
to be shut down during the elections because of incidences that has
happened in other countries.  And the whole public came up, the media,
everybody came up.  So the government, the President, they had the option
-- not an option, but the President came up to issue a communique that the
network was not going to be shut down during the elections. Fortunately for
us in Ghana, the President happens to be a former Minister of
communications.  He also happened to be the first board Chairman of the
telecom regulator, so he understands technology and he appreciates it.  So
he came up and issued a communique just to assure the citizens of Ghana
that the network was not going to be shut down during the elections.  After
that, still the civil society groups that are coming out, people were still
not -- even though the President has issued that statement, people were
still in a little bit of doubt. But last week, about two weeks ago, we
organised our cyber week, which was part of our the U.S. government,
security programme that is being implemented and as part of creation, we
organised a security week where the whole society was there.  And the
ministry of communication really assured the general public at the form um
that the Internet was not going to be shut down before, during and after.
And the Director General or the head of the telecom regulator also did
same.  Reassured the general public that the Internet was not going to be
shut down.  Subsequent to that, organised a press Forum with the media to
reassure them that, hey tinternet is not going to be shut down during the
elections and afterwards.  And then we also organised another workshop with
the telecom operators and ISB, to also assure them that it wasn't going to
be shut down and all that.  So fortunately for us, today is election day,
and my time is almost going to about 4 o'clock p.m., and the network has
not been shut down.  So far the elections have been peaceful. [CHEERS AND
APPLAUSE] People are going around voting and everything.  And it's not been
shut down.  So I think -- having said that, I think when it comes to
Internet shutdown, it is not only about during elections.  When we look at
the social, I'm sure we break down to those discussions are going to take
place, looking about people over the top, the O. T. T. services where by
the operators is kind of disincentive to the operators because I work with
the regulator.  I know also the time that the mobile operators made a
proposal, gave a proposal to the regulator that, hey, people are now making
all calls using the wassup and it's affecting our revenue because the voice
calls are dropping down and our revenue is dropping down.  And if that is
happening, that means government taxes also dropping down.  So it's
something that has been proposed, that has been forwarded to the regulator
that a discussion is currently going on. So it's not about just the
elections but also looking at the social and the economic aspect.  But I'm
sure that during the breakout, we are going to have a lot of discussions.
I don't want to jump to conclusions right now.  Thank you.

>> ANDY O'CONNELL:  I'm andy O'Connell from Facebook.  Thank you for
organising this.  This is obviously an incredibly important issue for a lot
of people, standing room only.  It's certainly an incredibly important
issue for Facebook.  I'm not going to repeat any of the condition tent
that's been discussed already, but I would agree with everything that's
been said.  From our perspective this is an incredibly troubling issue.
And trend is in the wrong direction.  In 2015, we -- it's sometimes hard to
access, we will talk about that.  We think we were blocked by government 15
times.  2016 it's been more than 40 times.  So the trajectory is in the
wrong direction.  And governments do appear to be getting more
sophisticated about blocking the Internet for a number of things including
elections. The thing I've been told to focus on is one the economic piece
and two the measurement piece.  I'll be very brief. I think that echoing
Judy's statement about multistakeholderism, there's an important role for
the private sector, civil society, academics, governments in establishing
mechanisms to monitor and track when blocks happen.  It's not -- there is
not such a resource right now that's publicly available where it's easy for
a large number of people to understand exactly what's going on if realtime.
And we think that's an important thing that the multistakeholder community
needs to step up up on.  And I think that will be an you that we dig into
in the workshops. The second piece I'll talk about is the economic piece.
Our company's mission is to make the world more open and connected, and
it's really anchored in letting people share or connect with friends and
family.  And so for us, the Human Rights arguments, the social arguments
are very persuasive, but we have found that there are certain stakeholders
who are much more likely to be persuaded by economic arguments.  And so we
do think again the multistakeholder community needs the spend more time on
that. We've seen good progress on that front this fall.  There have been
two I think pretty important studies on the consequences of blocking that
came out in the last couple months that I'll just mention very briefly, and
I suggest all of you take a look at them. The first one is a brookings
institution study that came out in October.  And the headline of that is
essentially that between -- in the year that they looked at, which was part
of 2015 and part of 2016, there were 8 is blocks that they tracked globally
pursuant to government orders -- 81.  And the estimated economic damage was
2.$4 billion.  So a huge amount of economic impact.  And they were very
clear that they were only able to look at pieces of this and that the
estimate, the actual impact is probably much higher. The second study is a
study that we supported and worked with GNI to release I guess last month,
I think.  That was a study that was conducted by Deloitte.  And, again, I'm
not going to get into all the details, but the headline was they structured
a number of scenarios for government-ordered blocks.  And under the most
extreme scenario, a block cost 1.9 percent of global GDP if it's
government-initiated.  And then there's a lot of other scenarios and they
tracked the mechanism by which the economic damage happens. Again, I
commend both of those studies to you.  And I sort of call on the community
and I'm excited that we're going to have the workshop to really dig into
these two issues because both on measurements of when blocks happen, when,
why, how, and understanding the consequences, the economic and social
consequences, there's a lot more work that needs to be done.  We've got a
decent foundation. But I'm counting on all of us to work together over the
next half hour, 45 minutes to figure out what the next stage of that work
should be.  So thank you.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Thank you, andy.  We're going to open it up to
questions.  Just want to mention, first of all, those studies are fantastic
and really important contribution to this challenge. The other thing is
there are three victories within the past week.  One of them is that Chad,
which had a long term disruption lifted those restrictions.  Ethiopia has
also lifted many, if not all, of its restrictions on social media.  And
game be an did shut down the Internet last week, but before the order was
supposed to carry out from Thursday election day or the night before
election day through Saturday, international pressure, groups, members of
Keep It On and various stakeholders really pressured those governments to
stop their disruptions.  And Gambia, if you look at it, it was a small
country of 2 million, I do think that the shutdown brought a lot of
attention.  Most of the headlines around that election involved -- said
something about an Internet shutdown. So our feedback from local partners
in Chad Ethiopia and Gambia is that international pressure makes a
difference.  And it can come from other stakeholders.  So these were not
just random events.  They weren't arbitrary decisions.  Your contributions
from whatever community you're a part of make a huge difference in
protecting lives and economies. So with that, I don't see a place to
receive the Web ex questions.  So Andreas is from international media
support is moderating those and maybe we can coordinate there.  But we'd
like to open it up to 2 to 3 questions.  Then we'll go to the breakout
groups. Please let us know which panelist you're addressing.

>> I just have a question about the scope of the term international, just
see turning off the switch, "the" switch, that connects to all types of,
all URLs where obviously Internet shutdown, but is blocking of certain
social media sites; is that also considered part of the -- within the
scope?  I am asking this because the Korean government, through Korean
communications standard commission routinely blocks various platform sites,
for instance forsale.com, which is a peer to peer file sharing web site
that has been blocked, although it has faithfully abided by notice and
takedown under DMCA for Copyright violation., I mean for assisting
Copyright violation, of course. And also North Korea technology.com, which
is a media site that provides information on user of technology North Korea
also has been shut down by south Korean government for national security
reasons.  I don't know why.  You know that all north Korean government
sites are inaccessible, are inaccessible from within Korea.  So access to
those sites are also blocked. Is that also within the scope of the term
international tolerance?

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  I can answer that question.  We kicked off the keep it
on campaign by creating a definition.  I can read it now because there's a
transcript.  In Internet shutdown is an intentional disruption of Internet
or electronic communications rendering them inaccessible or effectively
unusable so that takes into account throttling for a specific population or
within a location often to exert control over the flow of information.
That's a very technical definition.  Duration is missing from the
definition.  Also two-way communications tools, because we think that's an
important part of it. So we're looking to refine that definition at our
coming conference Access Now's conference called write come.  We welcome
your input and feel it could be better and more effective.  The case
examples that you gave, the longer-term per, persistent disruptions to the
interin et at the moment wouldn't quite fit the definition.  But we can re-
examine that together and we invite anyone to participate in that.

>> Good morning.  Thank you for your presentations.  I have a question in
terms of scope.  So when talking about full shutdowns, I mean the control
of the elements of the TCP/IP protocol and stopping the connection between
the sender and the receiver, a personal account of mine is that since 2005,
there were at least 21 shutdowns.  I mean I know for the applications this
is a lot higher. But I believe there is a mistake believing that this is a
type of policy considered only for -- to silence the political rivals in
times of disruption, in times of elections.  This is a policy that has been
in the eyes of the well-established democracies for a while. Now, they have
different reasons for WHO participants they say they do it.  The most
classical reason is always on the basis of the national security, the
attack on the critical infrastructure, or the attack on the vital elements
that preserve the nation's data life. Do you have any insights into these?
Like I heard sometimes, too, some representatives talking about a cyber
Pearl Harbor.  They talk about this, but they don't know exactly how they
are going to implement it and when they are going to do it.  Okay, thank
you.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Sorry, did you say cyber Pearl Harbor?  Someone want to
speak to this? Well, I can speak to the -- we do know that there are many
causes for shutdowns.  So the 2 number that you mentioned -- 21 number.
Governments are disrupting the Internet for school exams when sixth graders
sit down to take exams because they believe they are cheating and sharing
answers.  University students, there are all kinds of reasons.  And the
public order around elections, national security they're cited frequently.
But we do know that there are several different causes. About the cyber
Pearl Harbor, that's something that I think we're going to be exploring.
It does seem that disruption by one government of another government's
Internet can impact this discussion.  But at the moment, that's not the
focus of -- we're talking about internal disruptions within state borders
rather than cross-border attacks.  So I think that's a slightly different
discussion but one that will impact this community soon.

>> I think one thing we've noticed since 2011 when there was a very high
profile Internet shutdown in Egypt that grabbed headlines across the world,
that a number of governments are looking for ways to do this in practice
without detection.  And it looks like that there are a range of attempts to
figure out how to achieve the purpose of this disruption without inflaming
public outrage and pushback or international pushback. So I think this is
something that is important in the definitional conversation.  We do need
to know what we're talking about when we talk about it so that the
conversation can be productive and move forward.  But that's why I think it
was wise for the Human Rights Council resolution to use the phrase
"measures by state actors to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or
dissemination of information online." For that context, that made sense.
You're invoking a right and trying to make sure that there is an awareness
and application because this same resolution establishes that the same
rights that apply offline apply online.  And this is clarifying what that
means when it comes to access to Internet information online. Likewise, for
the cyberspace strategy that I spoke about earlier, the descriptions are
that people must have confidence that data will travel to its destination
without disruption, assuring the free flow of information, the security and
privacy of data, and the integrity of interconnected networks themselves
are all essential to American and global economic prosperity, security and
the promotion of universal rights. So again this was passed in 2011.  And
there is an increasing number of tools in the toolbox of controlling
information online.  If you look at the Freedom on the Net Report for 2016,
they document # types of Internet controls -- 9 -- that governments use to
censor and control information flows and commerce.  One of those is
localised or national shutdowns of communication technologies and it's
happening in 15 of 65 countries around the world, the same countries that
are using this one of the 9 types of Internet controls.  It's sort of a
grab bag.  And they're going to use the ones that fit their purpose and
often avoid the most -- avoid the negative backlashes that we know are
there.  And I think that's part of the reason why the multistakeholder
approach is so important and I really echo what Andy and Judith said to
that effect.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Than  Gigi.  I think we'll break.  We'll go to the
breakout groups.  So we'll have -- no exercise.  We will not force exercise
on you. [Laughter] So on my right, your left, we'll have the economic
impact.  And we invite everyone along this table to just turn your Chair
around.  And on this side will be the elections. Because of change,
unfortunately, the technical measurements one, which is an important part
of the conversation, our panelist was unable to participate today.  So
we'll focus on economic impacts and elections. So everyone on this row,
please just turn you were Chair around.  Everyone on this row turn your
Chair around.  And for 40 minutes, we're going to discuss these questions.
We do have a goal within each group.  So just to shape the conversation a
little bit, we'll have a moderator.  So Andy will moderate the economic
impact, I will moderate the elections conversation. So just to ground the
discussion, so we're not starting -- we're going to start by looking for
one point of progress.  So something that has been accomplished within
either the economic impact or the elections.  One to to challenges that
need to be addressed.  And then one or two next steps or solutions just to
ground things a little bit. So we'll reconvene at about 12.  We'll aim for
12 to 12:05.  Thanks.

>> Just Martin.  You mentioned that you were missing an expert on
measurements.  I just want to say that there are a few people in the room
that have that expertise.  And if people want to find us, we should put our
hands up now.  Higher, Colin.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Yeah.  We can create one more breakout group.

>> No, I don't want to break your breakout groups.  I'm saying if you want
to find us individually to chat.

>> We do have folks in the room that wouldn't want to miss the opportunity.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Would you, Colin, be willing to moderate that?  Okay.
So why don't you come to this back corner here?  Anyone who wants to talk
about technical considerations can come to this cornerback here.  Sure,
yep, thank you. (breakout groups will have no caption.

>> NICK DAGOSTINO:  Hey, all, before we lose everyone, let's reconvene and
get started with the wrapup. If we can please sit down and get started, we
have just a few minutes to do the wrapup and I know we've already lost
quite a few people to some competing events that are going on right now. So
thanks.

>> I'm David Sullivan from the -- global network initiative. So we will
have a wrapup.  Is that better?  No.  Okay.  So thanks, everyone, for also
helping us to pioneer the breakout group format here at the IGF.  Very
curious to get feedback on how that went.  I know our space was not
optimal.  But I think at least from the economic group that I participated
in, I think we had some really useful discussions, some useful chances for
people to get to meet one another and start to strategize on how we can
adopt a multistakeholder approach to these issues. So I believe that Digi
had to run to deliver these petition.  So just based on some very helpful
notes provided summarize the discussion in the elections group and then
perhaps turn it over to others who were part of that group who can
elaborate. So for the victory in elections, we can clearly point to Ghana.
And we were very delighted to have the representative from the gambia
nayian government here today Ghanaian government today.  A person with
influence in the country and region.  And that's something that we hope
will play out in a positive direction in the coming months as other
countries go through their electoral cycles. Challenges.  I see that
decisionmakers may not yet understand ICT issues and that the laws in some
countries allow for shutdowns or allow national security laws to enable
shutdowns. And then, finally, we have technical failures that governments
can take advantage of for political purposes. Finally, in terms of
solutions, I see push for better laws, including laws on Human Rights.  We
need to be able to marshal the economic impacts arguments and joint
statements in order to engage with governments and to develop best
practices that we can share with each other. So I'm going to stop.  There
are I see a lot more victories, challenges and solutions that this group
has developed, but I'm going to first perhaps check and see whether Judith
or Katie has anything from that group that they would want to add to or
subtract from my attempts to summarize it..

>> JUDY LICHTENBERG:  I think that is a good summary.  We had one Vick at
this to point to with Ghana today.  But we had lot of small victories that
pointed to more attention coming to this you very formally.  And there was
a lot of talk about kind of taking those and looking at other ways to push,
like I don't know if you mentioned the Australia example, but Australia
developed a set of principles for blocking.  And the thought was that that
could be taken and applied in other contexts.  It could also be a potential
model on shutouts and that the FOC to look to it when they are e developing
their joint statement.  So there was a lot of creative statement on how we
can take something that's happening now in some of the smaller victories
and turn those into larger victories.  So it was a good discussion, thanks.

>> MODERATOR  Great.  Should we move, then, to the economic group? Andy?
Pass the mic.

>> Andy:  We had a really good discussion.  I'll try to go quickly because
I know we're losing people's attention.  But I think on the challenges
side, I think the biggest challenge with the lack of a comprehensive,
reliable dataset to get more robust economic analysis is going to require
more robust data, time series data, lots of of details, lots of coding.  I
think another big challenge we identified was the diversity of the ways
that governments disrupt access to data, information.  You have everything
from the DPI blocking to throttling, but you also have sort of policy
measures hike extremely executive taxation on mobile data, which some
people in our group might be seen as a type of blocking. There's also a
tension between having a very conservative, defensible methodology for an
economic study that excludes a lot of things that you know are important
but are harder to definitively measure. There's a tension between that
desire and the desire to have a practical impact on the behavior of
stakeholders. There's also a challenge of needing to localise a lot of this
information.  Sort of the studies that exist are sort of at a global level.
Typically done in the global North.  We feel, a lot of people in our group
felt there was a need to do this with local anecdotes, local data, local
cultural context. In terms of solutions, we're really looking forward to
what the measurement urmt group has to say.  Our number is solution was:
Getting a of better dataset.  And we thought that that would require sort
of a multistakeholder measurement apparatus.  And so I'm excited to turn it
over to them in one moment. The second thing was getting studies that look
at the longer-term economic issues, sort of the existing studies are more
about the like abrupt impact of a shutdown.  But a lot of people in our
group felt like there were longer-term potentially of more damaging
consequences in terms of consumer confidence, investor confidence, the
education decisions that people make, the business decisions, deciding
whether or not to start a startup in an environment where shutdowns happen.
But none of the existing studies seemed to capture that because it's hard.
But we think there's a lot of room for that. And then the last two things
are we think we need to do more to put this issue on the agenda in regional
and local and national fora, opposed to it's mostly at the global level
these conversations happen.  We think we can all do a better job submitting
proposals for local events. And then the other thing was doing more to get
international financial institutions to look at this issue, like the World
Bank, the IMF.  A lot of people in our group thought that that could
potentially be impactful in terms of generating interest. Actually, sorriy
skipped one have the last one is moving this conversation out of just sort
of the Internet Governance rights space and into more traditional
economists conversations.  So figuring out how to get this on the agenda
at, I don't know if these organises exist like the international
association of economists, making this not about Internet issues trectly
but a broader issue of interest to economists so they can do more serious
work in addition to the great work that's already been done. I think that
captures it.  I don't know if anybody else in the group wanted to throw
something.  Okay.  I'll stop there.

>> I think ours can be succinct as well.  As far as successful case
studies, I would look forward to look to the blog posts that were put up
and -- has also published on certain incidents.  I think these are really
good examples of characterizing the political and economic impacts and also
demonstrating that there's a po the ential for accountability that these
things can be monitored.  Are as far as difficulties, I thought there was
really good counter example that showed how many of these technical
measures are informed by our political biases or our expectations, which
is, for example, when tellster goes down and takes down the entirety of
Australia, do we think that that is a politically motivated or economically
motivated shutdown?  Why do we think that that's the case?  And also
demonstrated how crucial in certain respects external assistance, whether
it be active measurements from other data sources or whether it be sort of
country expertise, whether you find through personal relationships or based
off of social media, how much that sort of demonstrates this.  This is kind
of goes back to a classic joke RFC that there's no evil bit on the
Internet.  There's no like real political intent shutdown indicator. And
then getting back to the moving forward, what was unique, at least for me,
about this panel was that a lot of the data sources were sort of passive
measurements from service providers.  Those are entities that aren't often
in the room in the academic settings where we talk about ackive measurement
from purposeful tools.  And I think that this highlights that there's an
opportunity for commercial providers with respect to confidentiality to
inform the process and inform our understanding complimented by the public
data sources, the public tools, whether it be measurement lab, which I work
with, or ripe atlas or other, Uni, for example.  So it's not just that we
-- this is truly a multistakeholder process in order to gather really
rigorous and comprehensive data. Oh, I also missed that it's often
difficult to determine shutdowns in smaller countries where there are
regional shutdowns or whether there's an inconsistent methodology in the
shutdown across different service providers. But I think that that also
speaks to the value of making sure there's -- between civil society who
might have a better understanding based off of having people on the ground
and the people who are responding to it from a service provider perspective
or whether it be like accountability in public interest movement. I think
that's all I have.

>> MODERATOR  That is terrific.  Thank you, Colin, and all of your
colleagues for taking that technical conversation forward. We're going to
take this conversation forward in a number of respects.  Particularly there
is another workshop on this topic I believe on Friday morning.  So I
encourage everyone to go to that and to keep the conversation going.  We'll
be doing that, looking ahead to things like rights con and other
international gatherings in the future. So on behalf of GNI, Access Now and
international media support, thank you, everyone.  I think this was really
valuable.  And we look forward to continuing the conversation. (end of
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>> Welcome to the workshop.  We would like to thank the Internet Governance
Forum and the Williams and cybersecurity Forum in the Netherlands.  They
have organised this truly international and multistakeholder approach
workshop.  Now, as panel moderator of this workshop, allow me to introduce
myself.  And shortly present the subject followed by the presentation of
each of our panelists and afterwards we will have a social engineering sort
of demonstration exercise.  And, finally, well start with the panel
answering the questions that we bring today to the table in relation to sex
torsion. So, my name is Catherine Garcia digital governance and
cybersecurity law at the centre on cybersecurity in the Hague University of
applied sciences and also member of the women in cybersecurity foundation
in the Netherlands.  Online sextorsion is based on none consensual
pornography and refers to sexually explicit videos and images disclosed
without consent and for not legitimate purposes. In both footage obtained
by helped encameras, stolen or leaked photos and recordings social media
manipulation, and blackmailing training communications, computer hacking,
use of malware and -- it is a violation of privacy and a form and often
gender and intersectional sexual abuse for an objections based on negative
perceptions of nudity or displays of sexual conduct.  The current
architecture of Internet and -- these vulnerabilities lead to scalability,
replik ability and searchability for private information.  Although
existing private for mechanisms have been developed and improved over the
years.  They are still not helping users in distinguishing self-disclosure
behavior that might put them on interrisk. In the confidentiality paradigm,
privacy as the right to be let alone and our aim to create individuals
autonomous fear free from intrusions.  The confidentiality and paradigm
places a strong focus on security but not too much attention in enabling
transparency and online identity construction. This has been already raised
in several workshops in the course of this week here at the Internet
Governance Forum.  An all the privacy contributes in a big part to the
construction of one's identity, both in individual and collective level,
this is the notion of privacy underlying self-disclosure activities.
Therefore, we believe technologies located in the practice paradigm shares
such an understanding of privacy and pursue making information flows more
transfernt through feedback enhanced awareness. Considering the Internet
law as a Forum for public discourse, it is clearly undisputed that cyber
harassment such as distortion interferes with expression even if it's
perpetrated via expression.  Given that it is proa foundly damaging to free
speech and privacy rights, sex torsion is growing concern and needs a
coordinated multi stakeholder efforts to bring about greater level of
Internet safety.  Consequently in this inter146 sex torsion we aim to
restore order on the one hand alternate and behavioral approach which is
going to be the first tract of course we have for you today for our
panelists and for you to commend and react on.  And on the other hand,
adaptable and legal policies approaches and good practices sex torsion that
can be harnessed to keep up with technological advances. This will be
addressed through the social engineering societies that we have and
therefore after through our panel discussion.  Thank you. Now we will
pursue to introduce ourselves.  I already have done it so I will pass the
floor to my colleagues, members of the panel please introduce yourselves.
Can't can't I'm security director for Mexico system engineer and expert in
end user behavior and awareness programme.  Thank you.  Alejandra canton
Moreno.

>> Hi, I'm Su Sonia Helling.

>> I work at Google here in the Mexico office.  Oh my bad.

>> Hi, good afternoon everyone my name is Hanane Boujemi government manager
with Hivos.

>> My name is Nicholas.  I'm member of the recent training group and user
centre social media in University of Pittsburgh and my research topic is
self-disclosure in social media and privacy and social media.

>> Hi, good morning.  My name is Ramila researcher in Rio.

>> Hello, good morning, my name is Arda Gerkens from the Dutch parliament
and president of inhope, the network of all hotlines.

>> All right.  We will start with Alejandra that will explain a little
social engineering she has done over the course of the last two days.

>> Hola, buenos tardes a todos.  I want to say who we are, what we are or
better what we are in the Internet.  The answer, we are dozen, hundred,
thousand regarding of our banking information, our health, our work, our
friends, our vacations, our networks and maybe our sexual activity,
relations and even our preference.  It's a lot of information that needs to
be protected and needs to be protected because it's valuable.  And it's
valuable on money and it's valuable in power.  And not only for us but also
for a lot of people for good or for worst.  There is a lot of risk around
information.  And social engineering is one of them.  Maybe the most
important because, one, sometimes intruders get the chances when there are
general gaps in the security.  Well, they use it.  But more often we can
guess they get through because of human behavior such as the natural human
inclination to be helpful or liked or because people are reckless about the
consequences or being careless of the information.  I know that most of the
-- know about social engineering.  After all, we are experts in so many
subjects related, right?  Well, during the past two days, we did an
exercise with some of the participants of the Forum.  53 to be exact.  What
we did is that some of us work around the workshops, work around the
different rooms without but any badge.  We take out this.  And without any
IDs.  We ask some of the talents to register in some regular white sheets
with some printed column asking their names, their employees, where they
work and their email address.  46 didn't ask anything and gave us their
information.  6 asked a little bit more but with some and useless answers,
they gave us information.  And just 1 said no way.  I don't want to give my
information.  I already gave it in the station area.  Imagine.  Almost the
8 percent of the people gave us their information.  The conclusion of this
is we are so expert and so protective with antivirus firewalls, complex
passwords that we forget the basics.  Do not trust the people you didn't
know.  So if this happens to us, imagine what happens to teenagers and not
tech people. It's important to tell you that all the information that we
collected was used just for this workshop and just for statistic purposes.
It's already destroyed.  And also all the emails accounts.  So if one of
you gave us the information, please, your information is safe.  Well back
to our business.  Social engineering gains access to any systems despite
the layers of the security that we have implemented are now in hardware or
software.  The ultimate security wall is the human being.  And if that
person is instructed, the gates with wide open and computer text control.
And when computer gets control, some of the things that he or she can do is
to get -- access to your local information, access to the cloud
information.  Access to send Emails.  Access to the social networks
information, also ongoing support services post in your social networks. So
your personal information could allow criminals to open bank accounts, to
get credit cards, passports, launder money or to make fraud or even to make
you sextoward because they have your information, your personal
information.  And these could be even worst in many ways to lose all the
money in your bank accounts.  So unfortunately there are many cases of
socially engineering cases.  The only way you can do is promote awareness.
Thank you.

>> MODERATOR  Now we will start with the panel announcement.  The first is
technical and behavioral track.  And for this we have specific number of
questions that will be addressed by in the first place Nicholas and he
already introduced himself.  But a little reminder.  Nicholas Diaz, fellow
PhD fellow at use centre -- University of -- in Germany.

>> Nicholas:  Thank you, Catherine, for invitation, I'm very happy to be
here.  And so basically my research is on online self-disclosure and also
to build a connection on what online self-disclor your mean and how it can
be with sextorsion.  Basically social network sites that people share
diverse content and information in order to get some benefit like
maintaining friendships, blog, sharing photos, music, articles, et cetera.
So the process of making the self known to others have been defined in 1958
by -- as self-disclosure.  So this is basically in an offline context like
we are now.  So in the online context that would be redefined as online
self-disclosure. So there are benefits of self-disclosing.  We maintain
friendships. It's the key way of building social relationships.  So when
I'm talking about my interests, my what I like, what I do not like, I can
build an emotion a tie with another person.  However, when we do it in
social media, we forget that these places are not free.  Thief, et cetera.
Unfortunately engaging in self-disclosure activities can bring negative
consequences for users that go beyond the problem of image. In the case of
sextorsion, perpetrators that get access to the profile of the victims can
get their address, phone number, they can know about their interests,
habits, their workplace, and therefore they can build a social profile out
of their victims and start seducing the victims and engage with them.
Unfortunately these consequences are not part of the user's privacy
concerns until they live it in the flesh.  So why do we disclose more in an
offline context than online context? Basically I know how many people are
in this room.  Well, approximately.  So I can regulate my speech.  I can
self-censorship and I can follow basic rules of information sharing.
Unfortunately these rules and ways of behavior is not the same in the
online world.  So we talk about our personal life, we talk about, for
example, what I had for breakfast in the morning and that I had a party
yesterday and got drunk, and this information, it's often very sensitive
and very private.  The thing is that we, as users, are emotionally detached
to our private data when -- support. For example, if I lose my passport, my
reaction will be visceral.  I'm losing something that's very important for
me.  However, like Alejandra just showed in her experiment, we are very
happy and willing to give away our data constantly over and over again.
And that's actually because computers are social actors and therefore they
moderate the way we perceive our own privacy and the way we perceive our
private data online. So we are responsible as designers of interfaces, of
hardware, in the way people understand their privacy and live their every
day online privacy. We believe raising awareness is very important for
users to know how important their data is for them.  There have been a lot
of approaches on trying to do this.  For example, some researchers of carn
Gerkens melon tried to do the privacy notches.  They tried to apply
sentiment analysis to their posts on Facebook.  So they were warning them
if the post could be in a negative or positive way.  For example, if the
system was okay, your post could be understood in a negative way, the users
had a chance to hold it and not post it at the end. Many of this approaches
that are very interesting rely on very static approaches for awareness.
This is each one of us are different, each one of us understand privacy in
a different particular way and each one of us have different privacy needs
and concerns.  So in order for these approaches to succeed on engaging the
users, they need to be adapted.  And we believe that if we consider users
as individuals who could significantly benefit from learning about online
privacy, this is like taking a more pedagogical approach and consider the
user as student of privacy literacy, we can get closer to raising awareness
in the right way.  So we have defined an instructional awareness system
that its aim is to provide personalised feedback messages when detecting
user disclosures.  And consequently we have designed what we call software
architecture that we said we have described the architectural components of
such instructional awareness system.  And this as I said before that has a
pedagogical, it's a pedestrian gojal approach.  Resembles -- intellectual
-- systems have been used before.  It's not something new.  But they have
been used for academic purposes in academic environments.  And these
systems provide a learning environment to the student and try to give him
feedback and assessment on learning particular teaching topic.  For
example, sequel, the language for databases, and in order to generate this,
the tutoring system is contains a knowledge base divided into basically
extorts the main knowledge about a topic that he's teaching.  And database,
being a part of database user performance.  So if we think about it in
terms of privacy I can teach privacy to someone but at the same time in
order to adapt feedback and give the right guidance, I need to measure in
some way the progress of how this person is learning this topic or in this
case privacy. So we think that can be a way of reducing excessive online
self-disclosure.  And we are, if my research training group, we are
actively trying to make this happen.  And this is our big goal for the next
year and for the next years to come. However sextorsion has other
requirements, I mean we are not as I said before, this is more for online
self-disclosure.  But a very important part or aim of fighting sextortion
is the generation of consent because basically the perpetrators that are
disclosing these pictures, videos do not have any concerns on doing it.
And it's a debt in software architecture and we as developers on how to
generate right mechanisms for detecting consent. If some ways about
disclose a picture, we need to double-check, triple check if that person
has consent over that information.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  So now we will break out to comments
or discussions.  Who will like to start?  The software panel and then
participants, I'm sorry.  Any questions.

>> Hi, can you hear me?  I know we don't have enough time.  My name is
Hanane Boujemi just for the record.  I would like to maybe ponder the
question relating to the terms of use, the existing terms of use that we
have at the moment in various platforms.  Not only Facebook.  Facebook we
usually give it heed.  But videos can be exchanged on what's up and other
services.  And of course even Google Plus, maybe.  So I think it would be
very interesting to hear from Google, for example, since you're
representing that segment of the industry, on what kinds of terms of use do
you have at the moment to deal with this phenomenon?

>> I'd like to stip you hate two things, first of all the social
engineering which is really the way we work it as sextortion at our help
line.  Because what they will first do is through all the information they
get from you on the Internet contact you and build up a bond, the two of
you together.  And they will suggest that you will have a conversation, for
instance, on Skype.  And where the actual sextual contact will take place
and then sextortion will lead out of that.  So it's very good that you just
showed us that social engineering is a very important part of this terrible
crime, actually.  And I'm really looking forward to the results that
Nicholas will bring us.  One of the problems with sextortion is also
sending material you don't actually want other people to see.  And what we
know is that very young people, they don't have the ability to think about
what they do.  We older people always tell them think twice, but they
don't.  So it would be really good if there would be a tool if it they were
about to send it out saying hey, do you really want this to go online?  Do
you know what happens?  And I think it might be useful to in this
sextortion especially, I think there's a great challenge on the other
fields because it's very hard to detect what kind of material you want to
send out.  But it's very interesting to see this technology arising.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  So we have a space for a couple of
questions.  So please raise your hands.  Yeah.  First here and then. Yeah.
So first we have our panelists, then you and I think you're up.

>> Okay.  I want to follow Arda's comments by mentioning research done in
October 2015 about sexting and comparing youth behavior to adult behavior
and also how preventive measures, how it worked with the behavior of youth
and how they -- did they stop sexting or they didn't?  So I'm just quoting
from the research that "letting people know proximate the negative
consequences is not very effective as discouragement.  In fact, it's
recently been shown to have the forbidden fruit effect. And so focusing on
negative outcomes campaigns is communicating to youth that sexting self is
wrong.  We can replace the word sexting here with maybe even, well
sextortion or excessive self-disclosure is wrong without recognizing the
positive aspects of it.  So this is likely to be infective because youth
would not engage in sexting without any potential benefits, although it may
not be obvious to us or adults in the first place.  Instead, prevention
campaigns should recognize that there are some positive aspects to it and
make it clear that what needs to be prevented is only the negative aspects
of it, not sexting itself. So the reason I'm quoting this is, well, as, I
mean, as parents or people who interact with younger people, sometimes it
has the exact negative effect to tell someone that, no, this is very bad
and I ban you, I forbid you from doing this. So I think maybe a more
lenient approach instead of telling people no, this is bad, don't do this,
can be followed.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  All right.  So now we will give the
floor to the first participant.  Do you have a question?

>> Okay.  Thank you.  My name is Marcelo I'm -- I work with security in
Brazil on university.  We work with different kinds of malware, virus and
different programmes, similar for that. I think the principle problem is
the case try to extras Tate the persons, the users to understand the
problems with these technologies.  In the following years we have different
problems with Internet of Things on other technology that you will use.
And the principle problem is that the user accept or not understand how to
use specific security.  In this case I think the problem is Facebook but
the other problem is the application in Android, the problem of zero dates,
problems in the system, malware, the bought knots that try to keep your
information.  I think it's a very big problem.  Not only with sextortion.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  Thank you.  That was exactly what we
were talking about awareness, the importance of the awareness programmes
not exactly behavior but the use of the technology and also the online and
offline culture because sometimes you aren't aware of what are you doing
offline that will be harmful in your own life.  So it's basically that to
be aware and to be educate of the technology you are using.  Kratdz krath
the second question, please.

>> My question is directed to the second speaker.  A lot of the research
that we have done in India shows that young people when they self-disclose
people of any age, particularly when they are using the Internet for sexual
expression, including sexting, have a pretty good idea of what they are
doing.  And so I was very curious about the concept of excessive self-
disclosure that was up on the chart because my sense is that people, when
they use the Internet for sexual purposes, which is pretty of -- is very,
very common nowadays, do assessment of the risks and that perhaps the
solution is to actually use safer sexting practices, et cetera. So I'm not
clear what excessive self-disclosure means.  Because I'm a little worried,
to be honest, because it seems to blame the person for sort of disclosing
too much of themselves.

>> Nicholas:  Thank you for your question.  Basically as I said before, the
rules of interaction in the online world differ tremendously from the
offline world have and there's a very interesting paper from researchers of
carn Gerkens melon.  It calls "I regretted the moment I press shared." So
this is empirical research where people had reported a bad experience
online for having disclosing this personal and sensitive data. So these bad
experiences can be certainly mapped to a certain attributes that the person
had disclosed in that moment in time.  So when talking about excessive
online self-disclosure, it's that when you start revealing and revealing
more and more and more and more and more, the likelihood of some harm, it's
increasing.  So we have to find a way -- that's my research about, so I'm
spending a lot of time trying to decode it, to find out how to do it -- how
can we provide the right assessment? And of course this should not be about
a censorship for these activities.  It should be in sync on the privacy
needs and expectations of his or her online experience.

>> I think it's also important to distinguish between the two ways of
sharing consensual -- sharing sexual information on the Internet.  One is
with consent.  Debate on how to do it or whether you should do it or not do
it.  This could be a tool to help them.  Then you have unconsensual which
is when you get into the sextortion.  And this is I cannot emphasize it
more a very, very serious crime.  We don't at this point we are not even
thinking of how serious this is.  There are people killing themselves by
the fact they are being sextorted.  It is huge.  We have no idea the things
we get to our help line they are only the tip of the iceberg because most
of the people, they will just pay the money that they are being asked. And
I think that we have to also realise that the perpetrator who gets people
to sextort themselves, they use what you just called the heat of the moment
technique.  It's not something you can really think about.  It happens to
you also because there's a lot of dopamine in your bodies.  It's within
minutes it has happened and the video is out there.  The perpetrator is
sextorting you.  And I think, therefore, it is something that we should
really look on how we can stop this because it's, like I said, really
serious crime.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  Next question, yeah, please.

>> Can you hear me bay an tries from Brazil.' an anthropologist and I study
online security especially connected to gender -- yeah, okay. I wanted to
ask Nicholas but I think I could ask anyone.  How do you see sextortion as
being a form of gender violence?  Because we have at least in Brazil,
statistically it happens to girls and women.  So we're not talking about
any kind of violence or any kind of exposure or the consequences are not
the same.  They are very different.  Depending whether you're a woman or
man.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  I may take this question if any of my
colleagues want to also add something shortly, briefly. I do agree with the
fact that it is definitely not only a gender sort of phenomenon, but also
and most importantly we have discussed within our group intersectional.
Because we have to be aware that most of the studies usually refer to
women, which is true.  There might be more statistics, statistically
speaking, women that are usually victims of these situations.  But, in
fact, there is also the non-reported cases, which mostly concerns to
members of the LGBTQR community, so on and so forth.  Religious minorities.
So there is an intersectional, actually, and not only a gender-based
situation underlying the problem of sextortion. So I would like to move
quickly to the legal and policy track.  And for this part, we have the
pleasure to have Jamila of the society FGB Rio and also member of the
coalition on platform responsibility which actually recently, only
yesterday, I have been informed, has launched a book which I hope is easy
to get access to but is basically focused on terms of services.  So here we
will have Jamila giving some comments on what has been the findings of this
Dynamic Coalition in the IGF.  And also, then, we will open for the panel
discussion probably then you will be able to answer Han, nane's question.
The floor is yours.

>> Thanks, Catherine.  Thank you for the opportunity to talk about this
topic.  So, yes, as Nicholas was saying before, it's interesting to hear
this conversation because I remember when we started interacting the
Internet, the biggest concern we had was with our security.  And at some
point the economy -- okay, thank you.  At some point -- do you hear me?
Okay.  At some point it seems like the economy of platforms or how things
on the Internet work changed in a way that we got used to giving our data
to have access to a lot of information that are available online, right?
And we do that especially or guided somehow through the Terms of Service.
Despite the fact that sometimes we don't have to explicitly accept those
terms, the mere use of some web services imply the acceptance of some rules
and conditions that will regulate behavior online, right?  So considering
that somehow what we analyzed this this study, considering these Terms of
Service are defining how we interact online and how we exercise our Human
Rights online.  Because Internet is as we all know a tool for the --
privileged tool for the exercise of Human Rights, particularly access to
information and Freedom of Expression.  And also they also define the
conditions underwhich we will exercise these rights, in this case affecting
the use of our data, for instance.  We decided to analyze the terms of use
of 50 online platforms.  We only analyzed the Web-based platforms.  We
didn't analyze mobile platforms.  To understand how they deal with Human
Rights, Freedom of Expression, privacy and due process. It's interesting
that we find that there are several rules that apply regarding privacy.
There are lot of commitments regarding the protection of user data already
present.  The privacy policies, they are detailed, they are long.  They
usually give somehow a notion of how this data will be used.  But it's
difficult to understand how this may impact on users' rights, right?  How
the collection of all this data may impact on users' rights.  And that's
because we have a language that is technical and it's not just in a legal
way.  It's all a technical language regarding to computer science and the
mention of several technologies that may affect our privacy and that we
don't know how they really act. So it's more complicated to understand
these terms than reading a common contract for other types of service. And
at the same time, these terms are usually written in a way that they are
broad enough to allow companies or platforms to use data in different ways
without having to ask for a new consent, right?  So they usually say they
may track users' activities.  We found that that's almost all platforms we
analyzed, we analyzed bigger services, smaller services, so most of them
say they pay track yrs' activities.  They may allowed third parties to
track users' activities.  They say they may share users' data with third
parties without specifying which are those third parties, under which
conditions these data will be shared.  So it's mostly difficult to
understand how this may impact on our privacy. There are excellent
practices we observed, e special had I in the biggest companies.  For
instance they are mostly directed to informing user about the impacts of
their privacy regarding other users, right?  And it's exactly what it's
more related to what we are talking about today. So for instance there are
some tutorials, help pages, videos that try to inform users about the
impacts of the information that they share.  And these can be a very good
practices.  However, when we look at the relation between the users and
platforms, that's more complicated.  And the guarantees that are present in
the terms are fewer. On the other hand, when we talk about Freedom of
Expression, what we find is that the terms are smaller.  They are not that
long.  And they are not that detailed.  Usually you have several guidelines
regarding which is the content that is allowed or not in the particular
platform.  And then most of them, 80 percent of them have some mechanism
for flagging abusive content.  They include that in their terms.  But a
great part of them, it's related to the DMCA.  So it's just about Copyright
content.  And that's what you have on the Terms of Service. Regarding other
types of content, you usually have general clauses saying that they may be
taken down.  But there is no transparency regarding how that will be done
or under which conditions.  And I'm talking about only the Terms of
Service, privacy policies, community guidelines and the documents that we
consider that are binding to users.  We are not talking about other pages
or other mechanisms, right?  So it doesn't necessarily mean that these
mechanisms do not exist.  There is just no commitment in the legal document
that users have to accept to interacting the platform. So there is no
transparency regarding these takedown mechanisms, how they will be
implemented.  Not even to the potential victim of these type of abusive
content but also not to the users. So what you find is that few platforms
or I would say on the contrary, most of the platforms say they may take
down content with no notification, no diswrus at thisfication to the
affected user.  And more than that, # 8 percent of the platforms, that's 44
platforms out of 50, say they may end-users' account without notifying
users.  So it seems like there is a problem that affects both victims and
creators or users that are sharing their content.  And it seems like what
we need is more information and more transparency regarding that so we can
understand better how that can impact on our rights.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  Thank you.  That's hupper helpful,
actually.

>> Thank you for having me here.  I'll be brief because I think what Google
has to say here, we're not here as a representative of the whole industry,
unfortunately.  I just know one company. But I wanted to highlight that we
do have a consistent approach across our platforms and across our products.
So that's the first thing. And the other thing is that we didn't operate
about this particular issue in -- without information.  We actually went
and sat down with advocates, with victim groups and we really tried to
understand where this problem is coming from. When the first terms of
services were created, revenge porn wasn't really there.  So the phenomena
that comes over and over over the Internet has to necessarily feed back
into the product.  So we try to take the time to be here, to talk to groups
like the ones you lead to understand how the product can be adapted.  So we
have no tolerance whatsoever for revenge porn have we take it very
seriously in our platform.  So we have a system where you can ask for that
content to be removed.  So that's on our removal policies.  Actually you
can find that as one of the sensitive contents that we consider. And we
don't allow it to be shared in the rest platform.  So blogger, Google Plus.
Once this is asked by you or by someone to be taken down, it's reviewed and
it's taken down and it's not allowed to be shared across the platforms. I
will highlight, though, that removing it from Google search does not remove
it from the Internet, okay?  So we also have a mechanism to try to make ez
whyer for you to contact a site's webmaster.  Because if this image or this
video lives in another person's web site as a search engine, we're
responsible for indexing that information.  But we can't really go out into
the Internet and remove things.  We don't have access and we really can't
do that.  But we do try to give you information on how to contact the
website's webmaster to follow through on that particular request. I do
think that we all agree that search and these types should reflect the Web.
And these examples of what gets taken down should be considered really
carefully by communities like this one and by dialogues like this one. So I
think personally identifiable information, so if you find that your credit
card information was somehow posed in a website that's indexed, that can be
removed.  And the same way that's how we got to the revenge porn. We also
not only review the requests but we also demote on search.  So on the
ranking on search the websites that have been known or been denounced to
put revenge porn on there.  And I think that you should also think about
the rest of the way we think about this is we don't allow pornographic
content in general on our platforms.  We don't make money from it.  We
don't allow advertisement for pornographic webs.  And we take sexual and
violent content out of complete function in search.  Because we do believe
that there is a role here to play.  Obviously you talked a lot about how
much information we disclose.  Then there's a responsibility of those that
distribute some of that information without consent.  So those are two
sides of the problem.  And then the platforms sort of in the middle
receiving or letting things through because that's what we were created
for, to let the flow of information get from the creators to the users and
vice versa.  And I think what I wanted you to take away is a responsibility
to be here, to talk, to gather the information, to take it in and to try to
improve all the time on these practices. I don't know if you're going to
talk a little bit about sort of the legislations because you mention crime
a few times, right?  And I don't think it's very clear yet in all the
countries across all the jurisdictions what the crime is defined. So on the
platform side, I guess what I wanted to highlight was the importance of
having very clear definitions of what you're considering revenge porn in
this case, if you're penalising the content creation, the lack of consent
to distribute it, how to handle content for commercial purposes.  Those
types of things would be really helpful to have in domestic legislations or
in an agreement because that really puts the sort of crosses the T and puts
the dot on the I's of what we need to be looking at in those community
guidelines in the end. And obviously I think all of you would defend
Freedom of Expression and sort of making sure that these definitions do not
conflict with that right. So I will leave it there.

>> Thank you.  I just want to highlight something relating to violence
against women and the issue of revenge porn or sextortion.  Men are also
subject to that.  And I think we have to bring that up somehow here so
we're not too concerned about only one part of the problem. When it comes
to legislation, I think legislation is going to help in some context but
not others.  In the Middle East, for example, we definitely cannot aim for
legislation against revenge porn or sextortion because the perception of
the society, the cull culture, the religion and a lot of things.  There are
a lot of elements in the mix.  The terms of use, I'm going to go back to
that.  And I think the terms of use or the conditions under which Internet
companies usually operate I don't think are sufficient in the current
state.  So let's not focus on the regulation now because we need to find
more solution that we can scale to different regions. The terms of use are
a little bit neutral.  If you look at them very quickly, you don't see -- I
mean you see things like oh if you're a sex offender, you can't open an
account on Facebook.  But you make the assumption that you only have the
clean people on Facebook.  And that's not the case.  This is applicable to
many other services.  I think we have to get more serious when it comes to,
well, taking down content from these platforms because I don't agree 100
percent with that.  Because taking down content again in the context of the
Middle East will be completely different.  We will be talking about
censorship and so on.  So it's a little bit a sensitive issue, as well. As
I said, it would be really more useful if mat forms are more efficient
filtering through that content more seriously.  At the moment, we see a lot
of disturbing videos that are not being kind of addressed.  I'm part of a
mailing list where all these cases are actually being disclosed from
victims and also from other communities like LGBT community, like
political, all kind of people at the moment are trying to see a better to
moderate this kind of content on Internet companies' platforms. So I really
call for a more comprehensive rules or guidelines for people to use these
platforms.

>> If I can add to that, one of the biggest sources of sextortion is your
platform YouTube, as you probably know.  YouTube is very good in removing
the material as soon as it's flagged.  But the chances of it being uploaded
again are always there. Now, we have perfectly very good technical
possibilities like follow DNA or hashes to prevent this from being uploaded
again.  And I would really, really ask Google and Facebook and every other
platform to start using those techniques because like I said, this is a
really serious crime.  It threatens people.  It costs lives.  And I think
you should take your responsibility here.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  All right.  So just to wrap up, is
there any question?  Okay.  First here and then --

>> Cláudio, State University.  Another Brazilian in the game.  I'd like to
build on the argument that was made by the senator here.  I think we're
pretty if not solid, we have an idea of where we're going with awareness.
We also have an idea where we're going with the search foreleggal remedy.
And now towards the end of the panel, we discuss something which is really,
really essential, which is the ecosystem any cal response.  We can't rely
on -- this is not humanly traceable. What happens here is not humanly
traceable.  And we have, again, building up on the argument extremely
interesting and effective tools, content ID, for example, has an
interesting mechanism to filter Intellectual Property breaches. So we're
discussing now how to automate responses to hate speech.  We're discussing
how to make responses to the search of the truth in the last days.  So are
we not working a little bit more in automating because time matters and it
matters a lot here.  And this is destroying the lives of not only but also
of women and girls and women all over the world.

>> Hi, I serve on the ICANN board.  But my question is more to my previous
incarnation as a lawyer and a politician.  Because as Arda said, it's a
serious crime and it's costing lives.  But I understand it's not a crime in
many countries or it's not clearly defined. So are there any plans, from
your network, from all the people here, to very concretely start working to
make it a crime, clearly defined prosecutable crime in every single country
in the world so where there's this cross-boarder effect that the victim is
in one country, the perpetrator is in another, we don't get caught up in
endless jurisdictional discussions and we can very quickly make sure not
only to help the victim or to prevent, if possible, but to go to the next
thing, which is to -- and I see a member of the European parliament is
going to fix that for us.  Thanks.

>> I can't fix it everywhere but I can raise my voice.  I'm on the
committee in the European parliament, I'm a British labour politician.  And
I work a lot on this issue, the issue of online violence.  And actually we
do have an instrument in Europe and it's called the Istanbul Convention.
And even my country, the UK, has ratified this.  And I just heard -- has
not ratified this.  I just heard yesterday we have a more right wing Polish
government.  They are going to actually pull out of the Istanbul
Convention. So I think it was 2014 it was agreed.  Some countries, some
unexpected countries, have signed it and are doing really, really well.
And some countries that ought to know better are doing really, really
badly. A friend of mine in Slovenia who is a women's rights campaigner said
her government said they couldn't sign it because it was too expensive.
And our response to that has to be that the cost is women's lives.  I know,
but theis tam bul Convention is specifically about women here.  I'm on the
gender e quality committee, so we are working with gender and violence
issues across a whole lod of different platforms.  But I just wanted to say
there is an instrument.  There is an instrument.  And we are now still in
the 16 days of the campaign to eliminate violence against women and girls.
So you need to raise your voices and you need to be in touch with your
governments and tell them that the cost is women's lives.  So they have to
do something about it.  They have to do more than just sign it.  They have
to ratify it.  And then they have to implement it.  And then you have to
hold them to account.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  Okay.  Thank you for more the remark
rather than a question.  However to also add to this that currently the
Budapest Convention, as well, could be a framework of protection as long as
obviously there is a criminalisation of these behavior in the national
level.  So it has limitations. I also want to add that there has been
concrete criminalisation norms started in Philippines, Australia and moved
towards mostly Israel, Canada, recently U.S., many states in the U.S. have
criminalised sextortion or as they call it revenge porn.  And recently
Ireland has added its own legislation to the list. However, as most of the
panelists have already asserted, the criminalisation of sextortion also has
challenges and limitations.  Flows such as the narrow or very broad
definition of the behavior that is criminalised can be also a situation
that arises a challenge.  But also do not forget that as sextortion was or
revenge porn was defined, it was only mostly focused on the ex partner.En
that has been also reflected on the recent upcoming regulation,
criminalisation of this behavior. I think I have final comments on these
from my panelists.  So I will give the floor to them before we finish this
session.  Thank you.

>> I just wanted to react very quickly.  I guess you said most of what I
was thinking.  But I believe there is a great challenge.  And it's not a
simple criminalised/not criminalised takedown/do not takedown type of
solution.  And we have to -- we can't forget that any type of action or
regulation that we have on the Internet may an ifect the whole Internet
environment.  I mean, we do believe that we have to discuss how
intermediaries may be responsible for these type of things.  But we have to
be very careful in drafting or thinking about solutions because they may
affect our possibility of communicating or accessing information online.
That was my final remark.

>> I'd also like to add on the remarks and talk about also enforcement of
the law.  I'm coming from Turkey.  So it's real problem that the one fact
that it's know the defined in law.  But even when it is, it's almost
impossible to have it enforced. And we are discussing removing punishments
for rapists in certain countries.  So it's very, very difficult to have law
enforcement take seriously when someone goes to them and says oh, someone
is sharing a video or an image of me that I'm not consenting to sharing.
So I think we really need to remember the problem of enforcement on this
problem.  And also, finally, I'd like to say that creating more public
awareness in these regions is very important because it's really not being
taken seriously and not being considered as a crime no matter what the law
says or doesn't say.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  And we will five the floor finally to
one of the participants that has been raising their hand for a long time
there.  Thank you for waiting.

>> Hi, thank you.  So I think when we are e speaking about sextortion, we
need to also speak about rape videos.  It is a major you in India.  These
are. Actual rapes sold in shops and further used for extortion.  This is
violent of contenten three levels.  It's the rape itself.  The film mg.  As
well as the distribution.  And when we speak about -- and as you can see
it's not self-disclosure per se, which is leading to sextortion.  These are
the factors which lead to that.  And I think it is a very important point
to remember have and it's such big you in.

>> INDIAia that even the Supreme Court has issued a report into this. To
respond to this, yes, m inare subjected to revenge porn but I think it's
remember most of it is different for them.  The frequency is different.
The extent is different.  And it's also important to remember what type of
men are subjected to gay porn, it's usually gay men, transmen, young boys.
That's my opinion.  That's all.  Thank you.

>> The last two years we saw a rise from boys up to 50 percent of all the
reports we get.  Men and boy being sex toward.  And we're talking about 14-
year-old kids to 70-year-old men.  So this is also a very serious problem
for men. The video, if they don't pay, so it's financial sextortion.  If
they don't pay, the videos are sent to their bosses, they lose their wives,
their families, friends.  It is very disruptive.  I think last week, the
report came out that three men already killed themselves because of this in
the UK.  So I think we should really consider this is a crime which is very
serious to women and men both.

>> Quick reflection.  Maybe the solution to the issue is not on the
Internet or with Internet companies.  We have to look at the subjects also
from the sociological point of view.  And I've heard something recently in
the Netherlands that basically about sex education.  It starts from there,
in my opinion.  It's not about opening an account on Facebook or Google
Plus or so on.  The kids who are very close to their parents, even though
they engage at sexual activity at a later stage, I think people that engage
in revenge porn and these activities, they are, I think, personally there
is a percentage of them that are not sexually educated or they went
probably through traumas and so on so we have to bring a stakeholder from
the socio, even cultural point of view to discuss these issues because I
see some kind of connection with that, as well.  So maybe we have to look
outside the Internet fora for the solution, as well.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  All right.  So finally to wrap up
before we close the session, we have the last question.  Or remark.

>> Nicholas:  Yeah, related to but my point is that perpetrators very often
get in touch with their victims using their social media profiles.  So they
have all the information there just to get in touch with you and engage
with you.  And therefore committing this crime. And I was hearing today and
the day before a lot about connectivity, how can we generate, promote
connectivity in the parts of the world that do not have Internet access and
so on.  I think on one side this is excellent.  But we have to prepare new
online members, new members of the Internet regarding their privacy.  And I
think that I'm trying to fight in that direction very seriously.

>> I'm sorry.  Maybe I wasn't clear when I was saying --

>> Nicholas:  I totally understand it.

>> They don't meet the survivors through social media.  These are actually
--

>> Nicholas:  I totally understand the concept.  But those are two
different things.  That one leads to the other in some cases, but what you
just said, it's very close, but it requires other measurements.

>> No technology plays a role here only in the filming and the
distribution.  It doesn't play a role in the perpetrators meeting the women
where I was involved.  I wanted to make that clear.

>> CATHERINE GARCIA VAN HOOGSTRATEN:  We want to thank ones again the
Netherlands intergovernance Forum to for bringing us together.  As well as
the women's in the neats he Netherlands.  Please follow up the discussions
on Twitter.  But also follow up the report I'm going to submit after this
IGF session.  So we will have a report online.  And you can see the
conclusions that will be raised there.  Thank you very much. [Applause.]
(end of session).

>> Also, a report of the session will be on the digital watch observatory
at the end of the >> Okay.  I can just talk to them.  Hi, we're waiting to
are the signal to get started.  So if you would kindly relax.  Just make
sure you're at the right workshop.  This is -- in south Asia.  Mod pod good
afternoon, everyone.  Welcome to this workshop, tech women driving ICT
innovation and collaboration in central Asia and south Asia.  The workshop
purpose is to explore collaborative programmes that will focus on women in
technology and its implications for inclusive and sustainable growth among
various players in central Asia and south Asia.  And for our purposes, we
are looking at 13 countries Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the mull dives.
I'm sorry that I did not have time to do time to do a chart of this
information, but the important things out of this chart are the figures
related to penetration or percent of population.  So, for example, in
Afghanistan, it's only a 12 percent penetration.  And then I think the
highest one is mull dives which is 6 to 7 percent.  As you can see from the
raw data, there is a lot of work to be done in terms of inclusiveness and
getting the Internet out to those various countries.  So for today's
agenda, we're going to have an overview of the Internet Governance
framework.  We will do country presentations from Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Taj icky Stan will be online.  And then we will break up into small
group sessions to look at three issues related to capacity building.  We'll
do a report back to the larger group.  And then action planning.  And as
part of the action planning, we have some resource speakers who can speak
to us about the possibilities and opportunities that their organizations
can provide at the regional level. So in terms of super net governance --
Internet Governance, what are we talking about.  We're talking about three
things mainly.  We're talking about stakeholders, issues and decisionmaking
processes.  Who makes the decisions about the Internet in a particular
country?  It's another more complex chart with regards to what the
different issues are, who the different actors are, and where the
decisionmaking rests.  So just as a reminder for everybody some of the
issues we're focusing on is telecom infrastructure, the protocol standards
and services and content and applications.  I'm reviewing this because they
will be important as we talk about capacity building.  And then in terms of
the decisionmaking processes, some of them are related to technical
decisionmaking.  Some of them are concerned with infrastructure and access,
decisionmaking and public policy issues.  And of course a question of
whether or not there is a national Internet Governance Forum. Stakeholders.
We are all stakeholders in Internet Governance.  Some of us are with
government.  Some of us are with technical agencies.  Some of us are with
academics.  Civil society and I wear my consumer hat, as well.  A user of
technology. So briefly again, those three things, issues, stakeholders and
where do the decisionmaking processes rest in each country?  And in
addition, the country presentations will focus also on gender policy and
practice and technology and the reason for why we're together,
recommendations for a tech women in central Asia, south Asia and we just
call it casa for now. So we'll start with the country presentations.  But
before that, let me just go through the small discussion group sessions so
that you can be thinking about which group you want to be with.  So one
discussion group 1 will talk about fostering collaboration among target
countries by creating a network of women in technology in casa.  Discussion
group 2 will explore capacity building ideas including online learning that
could be done on a collaborative basis in the region.  And discussion group
3 explore what technologies could facilitate collaboration among women, for
example, a platform for networking, an online repoztor of resources and I'm
sure you have other examples as well.  So that's your sort of as we
multitask, you think about those discussion points as you are listening to
the country presentations. So with that, we will start from the bottom of
the list with Pakistan.

>> I work an organisation called code for Pakistan.  I know we have very
little time so I'll run through this quickly.  I'll talk a bit about policy
and decisionmaking and some of the work that our organisation does and then
talk about some other as pejts of Internet Governance -- Internet
Governance public policy.  Often defense concerns can take precedence over
the interests of citizens. An example of this is the frequent suspensions
of cell service during religious holidays and public events.  Moral and
religious concerns also affect availability and access of condition tent
online in the most prominent example of that is the YouTube ban, which went
on and off, continued for about eight years and was just recently lifted
earlier this year. People in charge of IT policy are in many instances not
from IT backgrounds, so they have a lack of expertise and limited
understanding of Internet architecture and other concepts.  Hoism the IT
policy draft was drawn up in consultation with IT professionals so that's a
step in the right direction.  Some policies under development are publicly
released as drafts and input is sorted encouraged in stakeholders.  However
there's no transparency on some decisions are actually made in the end.
The prevention of electronic crime bill which was recently passed and
highly controversial.  When the act was introduced it was highly cite
sized.  And there was feedback from civil society organizations wasn't
really taken into account.  And the bill was just recently passed. I'll let
-- talk more about policy and practice.  Women in Pakistan largely face
restrictions to the Internet due to cultural and societal factors
particularly in rural areas there's a huge divide that needs to be bridged
in terms of access and digital literacy. The Pakistan association of
software houses, the president is also a woman and she runs -- as well has
conducted research on the IT industry but there is a need more more
comprehensive method allege research.  The last survey conducted about four
years ago.  Part of our work with government departments to improve their
service delivery by leveraging technology.  Democracies an organisation
that we work very closely with on multiple initiatives they run a gender in
tech programme capacities and digital security and of women in media for
effective use of ICT tools and on encountering gender abuse online.  To
policy reviews from gender lens is required before developing a
comprehensive strategy building.  One is to start with a network of
organizations both commercial and nonprofit that engage and work with women
in tech at various levels.  Advocacy and awareness raising is also
necessary to change societal attitudes about women's access to tech and
their participation in the space and not just focused on women but entire
communities.  And the men who hold the decisionmaking power in our society.
Regional network like this would be incredibly helpful in developing
methodologies and approaches to such research and tech is generally a male
dominated field.  A network like this can allow ultimate gender to develop
and map and analyze and combat challenges to diversity inclusion in digital
spaces.

>> Thank you.  Hello everyone.  I'm Numana Suliman.  Pioneering
organisation with the perspective of social rights and social justice.  The
fact that my colleague has talked about I will avoid repetition.  Basically
I will be focusing with a little -- we have different focus but on the
whole it's like to you curb or to end violence against women driven buy
technology and for the digital safety and capacity building and all that
stuff.  We have been doing.  It's basically a research and advocacy
organisation around all these issues and all these thematic areas. So with
regards to the policy thing, there are like quite different things
happening.  Talked about the electronic crime base which is another form.
So there have been several reservations from the civil society organisation
not only from the organisation who are like very much into the digital
rights discourse but also from the organisation who are like solely like
coming from the Human Rights perspective, as well.  So now it is being
passed.  And some of the concerns were addressed.  But there are sometime a
lot of room for improvement in those laws and policies which can be
indiscriminately those can be used to curb Freedom of Expression and
opinion or association or assembly.  So there is a dire need to have a
review on that.  Since this discussion is being revolved round the tech
women and the issues regarding women facing so back in my country, to be
patriotic, Pate rye arcky society, it is like different social fabric.
Mostly happens in most of the south Asian countries I can say.  But in my
country it's like the access is there though there is an advent of 3 G and
4 G technology.  But still the people are not necessarily in the urban
areas but in rural areas as well specifically they are like having a kind
of remote access.  And even when it comes to the point of access, then
women are like they have less access because of that all like norms and
societal pressures.  So currently the recent research which fight for all
did the Internet access in Pakistan showed that there are like almost 30
million users of Internet.  But of course women are like less in numbers.
So when it comes to the use of Internet, so first they don't have that kind
of infrastructure.  You don't have that facility even if they have that
facility so there is a need of capacity building as well.  So how they can
use Internet safely because there is a lot of cases and things we have seen
which were basically the violence against women using the technology as
well.  There is a report we wrote technology violence against women which
you can find on our website.  There were several case studies we did and
sometimes if you are uploading your pictures, if you are like sharing your
views, so being a woman, it's easy.  You are being to give like kind of
shut up call or being harp assed or abused.  But it happens in different
genders, as well.  So gender equality comes in question, then.  So it's not
like that all the like genders of people from different sexual orientation
or stuff like that, they are equal.  And then when it comes to the women
and then if you narrow it down to the minority women, then they have a
double jeopardy.  Happened to be women in that male dominated society and
happened to be a form of minority faith.  So there is a different story for
them, as well.  And even the minority communities like whether they are on
the basis of their language or culture or ethnicity, so there is a
difference how they deal with all these challenges there which are being
brought not like only because of the de facto situation there but because
of the -- situation as well.  So therefore it's like we see, it's a good
thing and opportunity that we can like move forward by building this kind
of network.  And learning from each other how we can better address all
these issues and get them resolved so we can have a peaceful word in the
technology arena, as well.  So having the rights online and offline, as
well.  Thank you.

>> Thank you.  Now we'll hear from Afghanistan.  Please introduce yourself.

>> I have my presentation there.

>> Can I have some technical support?  Can I use this?  Okay.  My name is
Omar Mansoor Ansari.  We are based in Kabul.  We do technology development,
startup support, community technology and some policy advisement.  One of
our programmes is called tech women Afghanistan which is a network of
diverse stakeholders.  It's a women-led, women-focused initiative helping
bring together women with technology background to get us where they can
support each other through different activities as well as to support other
women who are not in technology by providing them with computer literacy
programmes, awareness on technology and different other issues. Our
presentation, I'll be co-presenting with my colleague Shabani Mansouri.
Overview of Afghanistan.  The presentation is called Afghanistan plus tech
women.  So I'm going to be doing Afghanistan and she's going to be doing
the tech women part.  I'll be giving you like a general overview of how the
situation related to technology access and telecoms, ICTs is Afghanistan
have and then we'll go to Shabana and hear from her about what the status
of tech women is and how they're dealing with the situation and what
activities and all are. Okay.  So let's go to this is -- can you go back?
This is about the spectre.  This is our tech women sum miment last year
where we brought together about 250 women in technology in Kabul.  It was
big summit.  It was opened by -- chaired by the First Lady of Afghanistan.
We had cabinet members.  People from the industry leaders, the government
of Afghanistan and civil society.  And the major issues we discussed here
why how we can promote and support women in technology in Afghanistan.  So
let's go to the next slide.  Just in order for the people who do not know
where Afghanistan is located, this is the map.  Yeah.  You see I'm sure you
know, but, still, when we say casa, the central Asia south Asia, you see
above Afghanistan, central Asia, below Afghanistan is southern Asia. On the
left side you will see Middle East.  On the right side you will see China.
Which by itself a region, right?  Afghanistan is in the middle of these
three, four regions.  Sometimes we are considered as part of central Asia
like if you see the UNESCO documents, you will see Afghanistan as part of
central Asia.  But when you see the World Bank, some U.S. government and
others, you will see it as part of the south Asia.  And we are member of
this south Asian packet, forgot the name of.  Yes, we are member of that.
But when you see the ICANN documents.  They put us in the Middle East.  So
it's quite confusing sometimes. In casa is south Asia, central Asia, and
the reason Maria and I thought about doing casa thing was that -- not being
able to connect with the rest of the world.  South Asia compared to central
Asia has like more access to education, to opportunities, to the resources.
So in order for us to transfer the knowledge from south Asia in
technologies from south Asia to central Asia, we thought it will be good to
bring these two subregions together so they can collaborate. There are a
few things I wanted to share with you.  The technology infrastructure, we
have information technologies here, honorable Wahab San, dat, who might
intervene when we come to the resource persons discussion.  And we have two
other very informative personnel from the mini industry of communications
here.  They might talk more about what the situation is and how they are
planning it in the future.  But this is just an overview.  Voice and data,
when it comes to the voice and data infrastructure, there are technologies
used like satellites.  We have an afghan sat and Ymax.  GSMNCDMA operators.
We have land line and 3 G connections.  There is a national data centre and
operations centre which is a centre for cyber emergency response team which
basically deals with a cybersecurity issues. One of the biggest assets
Afghanistan has, I'm going to go back to the map slide, is the optical
fiber ring.  Can you go back to the map?  When you see the map of
Afghanistan, there is a ring, optical fiber ring within Afghanistan that
connects the major provinces with each other.  And then data provinces are
linked to the main optical fiber ring.  And then it's connected in the
north with Taj icky Stan, Uzbeky sten and -- and in the south with Iran and
in the east with east and southwest Pakistan in two locations.  One is tour
ham on the line and other is bin bullic and we are connecting with China
very soon.  So that provides like the only hub in the region which would
contribute a lot to the regional collaboration when it comes to the data
flows and a lot of other collaboration in the information communication
technologies. In terms of access, we have over 24 million subscribers.  The
total population of Afghanistan is about 30 million.  GSM active
subscribers include 18.5 million.  3 G subscribers is about 18K.  And
population coverage is about 89 percent.  That's both voice and data.
Internet users, that's very low, about 500,000.  Investment in total in the
past 15 years is about 2.2 billion U.S. dollars.  The figures are as of
from the September 2015.  I couldn't find the latest figures on the
ministry's website or other source, but I'm sure the figures have changed
and improved, especially with the rollout of the fiber insert and provinces
as well as the 3 G expansion across Afghanistan. We have one major problem
which I discussed this yesterday, as well.  And that's the cost of Internet
which really limits our access to not only the Internet but so many other
resources like education, business, development and social development.
Internet in Afghanistan costs 300 US dollars per connection.  That's for
redundant connection.  And redundant means when there is a fiber cut, you
will have a backup.  Which doesn't happen all the time.  I had like five
hours.  I have redundant connection.  Like the contract says it's
redundant.  But there was like four hours that we didn't have Internet.  I
call this ISP.  I told them hey, what's going on?  They said there is a
fiber cut.  I said we have written connection.  What does that mean?  He
goes, get me Internet from satellite or somewhere else.  I mean that's your
job.  But they were saying no.  There's no option.  So the redundant still
has a problem.  It done mean you will get 99.9 percent of the connection.
But for nonredundant is 150, which means you could have -- you could not
have Internet for weeks or something. Fiber to home, that's another big
issue.  Although we have the biggest asset of being the hub in the region,
when it comes to the fiberoptic erg, but if you want to bring fiber to
home, there are additional costs.  The 150 to $300, that's monthly
subscription if he for one MBPS connection.  If you want to get a 10 MbPS
connection, then you need to multiply that figure by 10.  Plus their
monthly maintenance fee which is $550.  And there is one-time installation
cost which is from $2,000 to $30,000 depending how far you are from the
main fiber cable.  Other challenges include availability in certain areas,
security issues.  Engineers cannot go to maintain the fiber in other
infrastructure.  And investment of the private sec torp because of lack of
security and stability in certain areas. The policy process includes --
time's up. Though is the policy policy.  I'll yickly wrap it up and pass it
on. With laws when it comes to technologies, they draft the laws and then
parliament has to approve it for the policies MCIT drafts it and cabinet
approves it and regulations are done directly by the ministry of
communications in IT. Sometimes they bring consultants to do their policy
formulation for them who do not understand the local needs.  They are not
aware of the issues and challenges.  That's why sometimes the policies
cannot address issues locally.  But it's improving.  They are e trying to
do some open consultations. Human resources is one of our biggest
challenges.  We do not have the capacity or expertise in certain areas that
is required, especially when it comes to the public policy and regulatory
issues. Stakeholders involved are diverse.  This is the list which I can
share with you later on.  But there are like a few big projects which are
really contributing to the ICT sector development in Afghanistan.  There's
$50 million World Bank funded project called ICT sector development.  It's
divided into different smaller components which is like business
incubators, policy development, trainingings and different other areas.
Digital casa, digital central Asia south Asia is another World Bank project
like a cable coming from the central Asia and going to the south Asia to
connect the region together. More details, promote that's $216 million
project.  The biggest in the U.S. government's history that's helping
empower women across Afghanistan. Another NATO project with general review
the total population of women constitutes 48.46 percent.  Female literally
is 49.2 percent.  Tech involvement is 3 million now.  Very low in 2001.
Public university enrollment is 62 K for women.  And women life expectancy
is 64 years.  Thank you and gracias.

>> Hello, everyone.  This is Shabana, I work for tech women Afghanistan at
the same time having two hats here, tech woman and also ISOC Afghanistan
and this year IGA. So contributing to the sharing of my colleague Mr.
Ansari, without any doubt, information technology has been one of the
leading drivers of economic of globalization have Afghanistan is having
fast growing ICT industry in past 15 years of development and also a new
generation of technology advanced and increasing group of entrepreneurs and
technology. Fortunately women are playing an increasing Rule in
participation and contribution in this growth.  Among the 30 million
population, 20 million have access to mobile technology.  We are 48 percent
of the population of women and 80 percent women have access to the --
mobile technology.  This digital literacy access has given them the --
international and also regional conversations. Participation in ICT growth
in the country in past one decade has been positive and increasing annually
by both male and importantly by females. After many years of efforts and
optional launch of tech women Afghanistan in 2013, three years from now,
through public and media presence, efforts thousands of women are given the
opportunity of awareness and encouragement for participation and
contribution to digital literacy as well as the importance digital
literacy.  Hundreds of women are supported and encouraged for current
technology since many women lose interest having current technology even
having education and degree and ICT.  Women are given support,
encouragement and capacity building to take participation and innovation
entrepreneurship related activities and events.  Fortunately women
participation innovation and entrepreneurship programme have given tech
woman a positive and considerable result.  Many of the winners of
participation in the country have been female just recently.  On the major
issues which was addressed or were corruption harassment and education.  We
consider these con trial butionzs key role player in creator of hope.
Peace through innovation and establishment of businesses in ICT and
industry and economic group of the nation and contribution to global
Internet Governance.  One of those chal evidence-based policienings not
having aisle strong government policy on gender and ICT.  Through joint
efforts.  Lack of connectivity and support to regional and international
efforts for capacity building, technical support as well as financial
support for the initiatives recently.  Not only intention globally as joint
efforts for supporting current initiatives and leading to the development
as well as for sustainability of the initiatives and the achievements.
Describes these chal enlsage especially for having connectivity regionally
and internationally to Afghanistan for supporting the initiatives and area
of woman in ICT through capacity building and collaborative efforts and
also through the joint efforts.  Thank you.

>> Our speaker from India got delayed at some airport.  So we have asked
ambassador Latha Redi, who has an freed to give us some information about
India.

>> Let me begin by saying you're not going to get a structured presentation
from me because I was asked to make this presentation five minutes ago.
[Laughter] But it's a cause that's dear to my heart to bring more women
into technology issues.  Let me tell you briefly my background.  I was a
diplomat for 36 years.  I was a deputy National Security Adviser of India.
And part of my responsibilities as the deputy National Security Adviser was
to work on cybersecurity policies and cyberspace issues India and on
Internet Governance issues.  So I can claim to have some expertise in the
general area of how Internet Governance and how cyber issues are looked at
in India.  And so I'm going to perhaps as Omar did, talk a little bit the
general situation in India and then talk a little bit about with women's
situation in technology. As far as India is concerned, where the technical
governance or important issues related to Internet Governance are concerned
in India, obviously the government plays a big role because though we do
have a separate information technology -- do you want me to close it? We do
have a separate information technology ministry in the government.  We've
had that for a long time now.  We passed the information technology act in
2000, which was amended in there was a separate department which earlier
was part of the IT ministry but is now a separate ministry.  And what we
discovered when we started looking at the issues of Internet Governance and
how we should be looking in general several industries had a very key role
to play.  For instance when you look at information security or
cybersecurity, it becomes an issue of national security and of internal
security.  So obviously the home ministry or the interior ministry as it
may be called in many other countries has a crucial role to play.
Similarly if you look at Cybercrime or cyber terror issues or user cyber
for terrorism, these issues would also be dealt with by the home ministry.
The foreign ministry would be involved in international negotiations on
Internet Governance as well as on the development of some norms on which
discussions could take place in the UN and other bodies.  You also have
specialised agencies.  We have set up an agency called the national from
for critical information infrastructure protection.  And that means the key
sectors which would vitally affect the economy and well-being of a country
are defined as critical infrastructures.  So for instance it could be
roads.  It could be power.  It could be the banking and financial sits
tempts.  It could be airports.  It could be the entire transport sector.
And it could be sensitive installations such as in defense, nuclear, space
installations.  Satellite systems that disrupted that can cause
unimaginable havoc in the connected world of today.  Also the commerce
ministry gets involved because there are certain WTO, trade and other
issues which get an ifected by the Internet.  So the first task was really
to build a kind of an architecture within the government to make sure
everybody knew what they were supposed to do and without too many overlaps
and gaps.  In government you can never avoid overlaps and gaps but the idea
is to reduce it to the minimum possible. The second job was to write an
actual cybersecurity policy for the country, which we did in 2013.  We were
only the nird country in the world to publish a cybersecurity policy.  And
we set up a joint Working Group on public private partnership in cyberspace
which was to say the government couldn't do it alone, the private sector
couldn't do it alone so wed to work together in order to develop the
Internet in our country. Now India is a paradox because at the same time we
have the second largess e the number of connected people in the world on
the Internet, the last figure that was put out by the Minister for IT in
September this year was that we had 400 million people online in India.
Given the fact that India's population is 1.3 billion, we still have
hundreds of millions to get online.  So it's a peculiar situation.  We're
the second largest connected country after China.  We have now overtaken
the U.S. in terms of numberless of Internet connections.  But we are the
largest number of unconnected people in the world.  Because of India's
immense size.  So it's a did youal challenge.  You're trying to find the
place at the high table to pay part in Internet, international dezs and
negotiations because you feel you are a major IT user and a major country
of the future to be a major IT decisionmaker, really.  But at the same
time, you have to look at it from the point of view of a developing country
of how are you going to get hundreds of millions of people online?  Many of
whom are illiterate and who have special language needs because you need
diversity in languages because many people do not speak English fluently
and the majority of the material available on the Internet is in English.
So I was asked -- I was given some general guidelines by Omar and Maya just
now about what are the decisionmaking processes within government?  I think
I've given you a broad idea of the government departments and so on who
would be involved.  We do have a national Security Council that would talk
about these issues.  We have a cabinet committee on security that would
talk about issues like cybersecurity and so on.  Internet Governance
largely has been coordinated between the foreign ministry as the main
negotiator and the ministry for information technology.  And they are both
on the same page.  India, after wavering for sometime has come out clearly
on the side of a multistakeholder system of Internet Governance.  But they
have also very clearly stated that it cannot be the old definition of
multistakeholder but that you have to have a more democratic, inclusive,
multistakeholder arrangement where the new emerging economies which are
really going to dominate the use of the Internet in the future, for
example, China or India must have more of a say in how the Internet is
going to be run or how important decisions are taken. Infrastructure is a
big issue.  Omar, you mentioned the question of optic fiber networks.  Last
mile connectivity is an issue.  But I'm hearing some very interesting
things from technical companies about the possibility that low flying
satellites could be used to overcome the problems of -- I know Google has
been doing work with balloons for the same reason.  But that cost has to
come down because if the cost doesn't come down, it would still be cheaper
to give optic fiber.  But I'm told that the cost is coming down to where
the cots the of developing infrastructures, using alternative methods is
going to be better. I think as far as on public policy issues, we have a
very healthy and vociferous civil society in India who make their views
known, and which is as it should be. I find the system has become far more
democratic and engaging with industry and in engaging with civil society.
We see that, for instance, the cybersecurity policy was put on the
Internet.  It was put on the Web.  And people were asked to give their
comments. The same thing with the telecom policy.  Right now an encryption
policy is under consideration.  And when there was a great objection to the
encryption policy, it was actually withdrawn by the government.  So you can
see that there's a give and take between civil society, industry and
government. How much time do I have?

>> I think wrap up.

>> So let me turn now to the question of women and technology in India.
Obviously as with all Developing Countries, women are not present in the
numbers they should be in the connected world.  In fact, a survey done
showed worldwide that the vast majority of those who are not connected are
more likely to be female from a rural background, not educated.  And that's
as true in India as anywhere else.  We do have some shining stars.  We have
women heading CEOs, heading some big companies.  We have people who are
working in institutes, Ghita is doing an an exemplary job in trying to get
women to take up technology courses and work in technology. And we have
some very prominent figures who are very frequently seen in forums like
this -- heading the Twitter government policy in India.  We've -- who is
heading Facebook in India.  And we've -- who is with ICANN.  And we have
journalists.  We have experts and people who sort of devoted some time and
attention to these issues such as myself, woman.  But by and large it's the
exception rather than the Rule.  So I would completely endorse and I'd be
happy to engage with your group in seeing how we could build a group for
central Asia and south Asia and try to come up with some concrete
recommendations.  Thank you.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you for that.  We're also missing our Kirkistan
participants.  So we're going to do hear from Zura, who is from Taj icky
Stan but will be logging in from George Washington University in
Washington, D.C.  Do we have Zuhra?

She has been texting me on the side.  Yes, I think she couldn't hear us.
But if we catch her sometime, we will do that.  But for now I think what
well do is go to our small group discussions.  Remember, there were three
questions. Fogs terg collaboration.  Ex portion capacity building.  And
exploring what kinds of technologies. So to make it easy, we could just say
this will be from here to there raise your hand, please, with the stripes.
That will be group 1.  And then group 2 from you to the U, to, yes.  And
this will be group 3. Now, as you try to -- no.  If you want to move to
different group, that's fine.  But please stay within the topic so we can
have as many specific ideas regarding to that topic. So group 1 is going to
do collaboration. Group 2 will do capacity building. And group 3 will do
technologies. And as you discuss, please also try to see if you can figure
out what should be kept national and what can go regional.  And please also
assign a rapporteur who would report back to the large group.  We will give
you -- you come with suggestions.  And we'll give you 15 minutes. Capacity
building. If you really want to move around, feel free to do so.  For the
purposes of the streaming, they will just do one of the groups, right? (no
captioning during group discussions).

>> MODERATORWe'd like to get back to the big group.  Your small group
challenge was to try to come up with some suggestions.  We're not
interested in problems and challenges.  We're interested in -- time's up.
We just want suggestions and recommendations. Okay.  Each group will have
about 2 to 3 minutes to provide the highlights.  It doesn't have to be
everything that you discussed in your small group.  Shall we start with
group 2?

>> Thank you, I'm Brandon from citrus at U. C. Berkeley.  And group 2 we
were charged with answering the question of exploring capacity building,
including online learning that could be done on a collaborative basis in
the region. In our group what I found interesting about our discussion was
that we didn't just focus on technology capacity building but capacity
building around the technology.  So looking at training and online safety,
also I think this is a critical issue especially we're engaging young women
and girls in technology, thinking about retention in the field and building
a culture of acceptance in the professional workforce of having women in
technology and making sure that those workplaces are inclusive and
welcoming.  And also around leadership skills, which is incredibly
important for women, even in discussions here, making sure women speak out.
We had specific examples using a train the trainer model in Pakistan where
you had -- you trained women in how to develop apps and then they go on and
train other women.  One that I thought was very interesting in Pakistan was
connecting women entrepreneurs with tech companies to enable them to have
monl brought band in the home so that they could engage in their business
from their home. And then also I think that we should all be acknowledging
what the Internet Governance Forum has done at promoting capacity building
among youth and women and actually having an Internet Governance course. I
think that's it, unless someone else from the group would like to add
anything?  No?  Okay.  Thank you.

>> MODERATORThank you very much.

>> Hi, good afternoon, everybody.  This is Hasim from Afghanistan telecom
regulatory authority.  I was the rapporteur for our group, collaboration on
woman network. Due to loss of challenges in fostering the collaboration,
budgetary, culture, there is less awareness and capacity building.  Some
suggestions which come out of the discussion was: First to identify
organizations in each country which are working and engaging with women
activities and technology. And the next is to do some research and provide
or pave the way for them for some capacity building through the fellowship
programmes of different technology summits.  For example, ICANN.  IPnick or
GSMA. After that, in this conference will pave a way to connect each region
or each country with another country and then do some technical exchange
which will pave some common ground for them to find the networks and foster
the collaboration for capacity building and make a better network. The time
was very limited and lots of ideas, so we can just report this of out of
it.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you.  Those who still have ideas coming out of their
heads and brains, feel free to send emails to myself or Omar during this
IGF, or even after. Group 3?

>> Good afternoon, everybody.  My name is Minia, I'm being bossed by Omar
today so I'll be presenting with Catherine.  Group 3 is a group of 3.
[Laughter] I'm going to take names today.  But we're coming up with a
concept. The name is not fessly novel.  The concept is necessarily novel
but we think is necessary.  So what we are proposing is something that
we'll just in short call "the hive." Now, the hive would be a resource hub
or ecosystem where women in this region that are interested and want to
gain more from the technology space will be able to post and join events,
have access to educational resources that would be uploaded and populated
by those potential members, educational resources would be on particular
site. They would be able to connect -- well, let me back up and say the one
thing that we thought and know that was going to be a challenge is how do
we find a common mat form, a common denominator.  Because again ours is
exploring what technologies could further facilitate collaboration among
women.  And so the common platforms plural would be Facebook, Twitter,
linked in and others where a lot of individuals use but have this hive be
sort of its own ever evolve ecosystem where women would have the support
that they need, the resources posted and the like.  And so this would be
multipurchase psoriasis, multimentional, ever evolving.  But using those
social media platforms and whatever physical platforms would be easily
adopted.  For this to not just be educational sup support for women in
central and south Asia.

>> I like the name, the hive.  You know the queen bee?  Exactly.  Two to
three minutes.  Just let us know if we're building a capacity building
network for women and by women in the region. I've written the names
alphabetically.  I don't see Marilyn here.  Sylvia, I see you.

>> Sill oh, my name is Sylvia.  I work with APNIC foundation.  I'm the head
of programmes there.  We do APNIC is the regional Internet registry.  We
are located IP addresses and provide a lot of capacity building for network
engineers to set up ISPs and IXPs and network around the region.  We cover
from Afghanistan to the Pacific.  So we cover 56 economies. We do have
fellowship programme that encourages women to participate.  And we have --
we pitch funders from donors and other agencies for capacity building for
women engineers that are able to build the network that they want to use
for their daughters and their mothers and the other women out there. So, I
think that for such a platform to exist is not only about underestimating
the technical capacity that women have but also that there were many women
that are very tech in Nickly able and willing to enroll and participate and
give time to these.  And it's important to look at the network engineers in
the region which would be a good base on which to build the platform. There
are lots and lots and lots of capacity building materials in the region
available already.  Most of them available free of charge.  We do have our
own share of those training materials.  The big problem that we have is
that most capacity building efforts are not necessarily done in a local
language.  So translation is complicated and collaboration, as I was
mentioning in the small group that we are working, is a wonderful word but
is very expensive not only in money but is expensive in terms of time and
effort and just to find that common ground that you need to be able to make
the commitment to work with someone across the world that might be -- that
you share, I don't know, a corner, an angle or something, and not someone
that is directly linked to the work you do. So it's important that you set
up expectations about what that collaboration actually looks like in terms
of times, commitments and then conference calls, things like that, kind of
rotates.  Everybody has to wake up early once, I don't know, every three
months but not every time. I'm based in Australia, and that rotation is
great because sometimes it will be impossible for me to join every single
conference call at 3 in the morning.  So I'm grad that my colleagues in Los
Angeles sometimes decide to just okay, I will wake up really early and you
can have a normal day at the office. So it is about being considerate with
others and acknowledging what already exists in the region.  So do your
mapping.  Very good mapping of what is out there and try to look for the
network engineers that are actually building the network.  There are plenty
of women out there, many from the countries that you have mentioned.  We
cover Afghanistan and some of the countries in casa, but ripe and CC covers
the others.  I mean, we will be able to support you at least on the
technical side.

>> MODERATOR  Can we have Joe?

>> Joe:  Sure.  Thank you very much.  My name is Joe.  Thank you for
inviting me.  I'm with the United States Department of Commerce Commercial
Law Development Programme.  10 seconds of my 2 minutes I just wanted to say
I find it very interesting and almost ironic that the word casa is well
known in central Asia, south Asia to mean the collaboration.  But yet we're
in Mexico and it means something quite different.  Your house.  There must
be some kind of ironic statement to make but we don't have time to delve,
to this think about the houses. I've been thinking about how the work we do
relates to what we've been talking about.  And throughout the course of the
session, I found that I think there are a lot of parallels. I should put
the caution that I have a limited view.  I work for a very small office
that does development work, technical assistance to countries around the
world.  And because we're small and because we're legally focused we don't
have all the solutions to all the projects.  But perhaps from the examples
of types of things we do. And in that context, we do an number of projects
going on in ICT and currently our largest projects, we're funded country by
country, are in Afghanistan, in Pakistan.  And what we do is in the ICT
world is try to work on technical assistance that helps grow the sector or
that generally affects the investment climate.  That gives us in this field
a lot of leeway because things that are directly related to, say,
connectivity obviously are important.  Cyber security affects the network
and therefore affects investment.  Trust in the network.  Whether a woman
feels safe on a social media platform will affect usage in development. So
we're able to get into a lot of different things.  And thinking about how
we are talking literally at this session about technology and about women,
and I think in our work, we're not focused on women exclusively.  But this
infuses everything we do. So, for example, we sometimes advise countries by
bringing in -- we bring in private sector or government experts who would
volunteer their time, say, to advise on a Cybercrime law.  One of the
issues might be how does this law affect women?  And that will affect us
because that is a policy we watch for. We also do training.  We also do
workshops.  We have it as a policy throughout the United States to include
women in our training and capacity building programmes.  Same for
internships and fellowships.  We in the past, for example, have made it
possible for law student to get internships with afghan telecommunications
firms.  Again, there's an opportunity there. In our small group earlier, we
were talking about there being several aspects here, one is the
collaboration itself.  And it's a challenge.  We agreed it's a challenge.
The other is getting the women, finding the women.  I do struggle when I do
programmes in the region, in all due respect to the folks who are here, who
are with me, to find the women candidates to participate if our programmes.
And if we look at the whole system, whether it starts with education or
training as some of our participants said, they would be available for us
to identify.  And having organizations that are dedicated for this that I
could work with provides an opportunity for me to put my programmes to work
in that way.  So I think that covers it.  Thank you very much.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you.  Let's go to Karen.  Yeah.

>> Karen:  Hi, I'm Karen Mccabe and I'm with the IEEE, which is one of the
world's largest technical professional associations.  We have like 460,000
members around the world.  We're really sort of rooted and grounded in the
community approach.  So we have technical societies.  But within those,
there are affinity groups and technical communities.  And one that we're
really proud of is our women in engineering affinity group.  We actually
have 600 of them around the world including in south and central Asia which
actually our largest representation is in India.  And the focus here is
looking at that full life cycle.  So it's from technology development and
use and teaching skills among those but also, and we touch upon it, I was
in group 2 when we talked about capacity building, is the entrepreneurial
skills, the leadership skills.  One might look at it as soft skills of that
whole ecosystem of ICT and technology and getting women comfortable with
it. Another focus of the group is also, of the groups, I should say, is
getting young girls excited about getting into the ICT, in the engineering
fields.  It is a cool field to get into.  It's something that we really are
needing in the world is to get more young girls and women engaged in ICT
from a profession.  And a big focus of the work in our women in engineering
affinity groups is to generate that, as well. So it's really sort of a
local approach where we bring communities together through education,
capacity building, networking to teach these skills along this full
spectrum along the way.  So I'll end here because I know we're short on
time.  Thank you.

>> Hi, I'm here.  My name is Laura.  I work for the economic corporation
and development.  We have a Forum where governments come to share good
practices on common problems.  And we deal with several issues ranging from
economics, trade, environment, health, education.  And today I'll be
talking about gender and what we do in gender. In 2013, the -- adopted a
recommendation gender equality.  It recommends members to adopt good
practices that promote gender equality through a whole of government
approach and in cooperation with all the relevant stakeholders.  It also
instructs the university to support efforts by producing data analytical
studies and collecting good practices on achieving equality in areas of
education, employment and entrepreneurship.  So in other words, what this
first recommendation from -- to this issue states is at least four
messages.  It's that there's no silver bullet solution, that this issue
needs to be addressed holistically with the help of the partners cross
institutions and stakeholder groups and it also highlights the necessity of
the evidence-based studies. And since the first recommendation the
university adopted a new recommendation on gender equality, this time on
gender equality in public life.  This was in 2015 last year. We also
carried out analysis on engineering quality in education, climate change,
financial education, health, taxation and science and technology. So having
been actively building a substantial body of work in the area, the
university created a gender portal in 2015 through the university gender
initiative.  So our gender portal compiles good practices, analytical tools
on gender across all university policy work. So examples of that include a
gender -- on science and technology we have statistical and model surveys
that can help countries to address the gaps of ICT usage and availability
of male and female IT specialtyists.  It is imperative we compile data to
develop evidence-based policies to monitor the implementation of these
practices. In terms of regional focus, the university has regional
programmes within our member countries.  So we have programmes in Latin
America, Caribbean, in southeast Asia and in the Middle East in North
Africa region, it's one of the regions where we've already implemented
projects targeting gender issues. So I invite you all to assess our portal.
It's university.org/gender.  And get familiarized with the work that we're
doing.  And we believe getting to know the data and implementing these
model surveys is a key input for you to understand what's missing and what
are the bottlenecks to improving gender equality.  So thank you very much.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you.  We have one more.  Facebook?  Maybe we could just
give them the URL later for the video.

>> So we will skip the video.  In terms of what Facebook is doing to build
capacities of women in the casa region, so we around this programme means
business which celebrate entrepreneurs throughout the region workshops and
training sessions and online resources.  The programme with women
entrepreneurs with knowledge, connections, skills and technology required
to build and grow their businesses online.  So far we have trained more
than 1800 women entrepreneurs in India.  And we are going to sort of hike
train more and more women as we increase our programmes in the region. In
Pakistan, we have recently launched this programme in collaboration with --
which is an initiative of the pan jab information technology board.  So
that's the SME prong of it. Another prong of how we sort of build
capacities of women entrepreneurs is develop engagement.  We innovate
through partnerships.  We partner with fast moving startups from around the
world to help them test and develop new platform technologies which would
benefit developers everywhere. We have worked with top startups from across
southeast Asia from India our top music April to Pakistan's top real estate
application to Bangladesh's top traffic app called go traffic.  We also
have the Facebook platform and also the FB start programme which sort of
works with startups and entrepreneurs and developers to necessarily scale
their products.  We give them the tools.  We give them the mentorship and
get them involved in the process.  We've also worked, this is very specific
to the work that we are doing in India.  We are also working with
organisation called key start on startup goal challenge where we partner
with this organisation to induct five women-led startups into the FB start
programme.  So where we'll sort of give them the mentorship and also the
tools to develop. Then we have the developer round tables and advisory
councils that we do.  Production engineering team from our headquarters in
Menlo Park to key markets in south Asia like in Pakistan to listen to first
time feedback on what are the market challenges and the values so we can
design and develop products accordingly. We also have Facebook developer
softwares.  It's sort of like a community programme where we invite
developers, from all backgrounds to raise awareness, solve problems and
build a bridge with our tech teams have I'm really proud of the fact that
in the heart of our developer circle, we have more than is thousand
developers, we have more than 1500 developers participated.  And lasly we
live by the principle of open source.  Many of the solutions we use
internally at Facebook are vibl to any startup or developer at
code.facebook.com.  So everything from building cross platform applications
are available on this site and developers are free to use that.  There are
over 387 open source in that site.

>> MODERATOR  Okay.  May I ask the resource speakers to please email me the
text.  I guess we can get it from this discussion, as well.  But whatever
you haven't been able to discuss, please share with us. I'm sorry I have to
wrap up.  It sounds like we will -- it's a good idea to move with a
regional capacity building for casa, central Asia and south Asia.  And we
shall do so by setting clear expectations, beginning with a mapping of
what's already there, which organizations are working with women, which
women are working with technology.  And I guess we also need to be clear in
terms of what we, as organizations or as individuals can give to the
network.  It's not just about getting from the network in terms of this
collaboration.  It's a reciprocal collaboration among the various players
and stakeholders.  So if you are interested in learning more about the
network and continuing this discussion, please email me, Maria.bb@gmail.com
or Omar, you can find our names in the programme and so on.  Thank you so
much.  If you want to stay for the video, the Facebook video, we can do so.
Is there another organisation happening?  Okay.  Sorry.  We're out of here.
Thank you so much, everybody.  And thank you so much for all the wonderful
ideas.  (end of sess >> Ready for the next session, so if we could ask
anyone who is just chatting after the last session, to take it into the
hallway that would be a big help and we can get started in our next session
momentarily.

>> MODERATOR  I think we can go ahead and get started.  I'll wait for the
cue from the technology people. Okay.  Well good afternoon, everyone.
Welcome to the workshop that's entitled a new social compact for Internet
Governancement.  I'm at American University in Washington, D.C. and a
senior fellow of the centre for international governance innovation, CG, in
Canada. The backdrop for this workshop is the global commission on Internet
Governance, which was launched in 2014 by CG and Chatham house in response
to some problematic trends including concerns about cybersecurity breaches
and lost of trust in the Internet, movements toward fragmentation of the
Internet the various ways with the aim of offering some guidance on how to
address new challenges.  So I would just as the moderator like to give a
little bit of background on the commission and then turn it over to our
panel.  We'll all have very brief interventions and then would like this to
be an interactive discussion. This independent commission was chaired by
Carl built, former Prime Minister of Sweden.  And it was made up of 29
individuals who represented a range of Internet Governance stake hold. And
geographic regions. I'll soon turn it over to Latha Reddy.  We also had a
global advisory network which supported which produced over 50 research
papers on papers from fragmentation to human aspects of Internet
Governance, interconnection and access issues, cybersecurity and trade.
Emilie Taylor will be speaking.  She's one of the research exports.  And I
saw Rebecca Mckin on here, as well, hiding in the back of the room who was
also one of our preeminent contributors. So this scholarship informed the
deliberations of the commission and the recommendations that were put
forward.  We also had a lot of public engagement in the form of surveys,
quantitative surveys.  We engaged through CG and the global polling form ip
ongoing support services two extensive public opinion surveys that polled
23,000 users in 24 different countries on a range of issues from Internet
Governance, cybersecurity and access.  Also contributing to the commission
was the OECD and mrk Kinzie helping with some of the economic analysis and
our work was enhanced by thought leaders like Kathy Brown from the Internet
Society, ambassador Eileen done an hoe who was kind to join us here today
and who will give us some brief remarks. So I just want to mention if
anyone is interested in looking at the specific recommendations of the
report, their available on the website which is ourinternet.org.  The 50
research papers are also available for free download there.  And actually
just today we launched a new book on Internet fragmentation called a
universal Internet in a bordered world.  Research on fragmentation,
openness and interoperability.  Also available on the commission website
and it synthesizes a lot of the research of of our experts that were
involved in the commission.  So the commission focused its recommendations
on a call for a new global/social compact which explains the title of this
panel and this workshop.  Global social compact among stakeholders to
promote a single, open, trust worthy, inclusive and secure Internet for
all.  Now, some of the recommendations are very specific such as in the
area of security.  Governments should not compromise or require third
parties to weaken encryption standards through back doors.  So very
specific recommendations like that and then a range of issues related to
Freedom of Expression, privacy, interoperability and openness.  And all of
these recommendations are available on the website.  So the purpose of this
workshop is to discuss some elements of this social compact.  Mechanisms to
achieve agreement and the best ways to build on an agreement in existing
structures to make Internet Governance more inchew receive and supportive
of sustainable growth in addressing some of the many issues that have come
up at this Internet governance Forum and others. So if I may, I would like
to turn the workshop over to my friend and colleague ambassador Latha
Reddy, who is the former National Security Adviser of India.  She was the
ambassador to a number of countries for India.  She was a Commissioner on
the global commission on Internet Governance and is currently a
distinguished fellow at CG.  So Latha, if I may turn the microphone over to
you.

>> LATHA:  Thank you.  I was asked to speak on the core elements as
envisioned by the commission.  And that's what I'm going to try to
concentrate on because the commission report let me tell you is a good
read.  I would recommend it strongly.  And as Laura said it's available
online.  But what we're talking about is real at this new social compact
that was recommended as part of the commission.  And commission report.
And let me just quote from a section that really struck the government in
India, my successor deputy National Security Adviser actually quoted from
this in his valedictory address to the biggest Indian cyber conference,
which is called sci-fi, cyber for you.

>> ITALY:  Says there must be a mutual understanding between citizens and
the state.  If the state takes responsibility to keep its citizens safe and
security under the law, while in turn citizens agree to empower the
authorities to carry out that mission under a clear accessible legal
framework that includes sufficient safeguards and checks and balances
against abuses. There is urge end need to achieve -- digital age in all
countries.  What are the factors?  What are the core elements?  I will just
run through, there are nine of them.  I will run through them briefly and
also tell you why these concepts that seem so self-evident seem so easy but
should be very easy to implement why should it even be necessary to talk
about them?  So I'm going to play devil's advocate a little bit.  Say
something about the core element but also say something about why it's
difficult to achieve understanding and agreement. Firstly, we talk about
fundamental Human Rights.  I know you will talk about that in detail
including prismcy and personal data protection.  The need to protect it
online.  And that we need to really address any threat to these core Human
Rights.  The question is when it comes to actually implement this, you will
hear different countries' definitions of what are fundamental Human Rights?
What are Human Rights.  You could argue that the United Nations declaration
of Human Rights is a bedrock.  But how it's interpreted in different
countries and cultures and governments is very different.  Even those who
are SIGNA torpies to it. Secondary, the interception of communications,
collection and analysis of use of data over the Internet by law enforcement
and government intelligence agencies should be for purposes that are openly
specified in advance, authorized by law, and consistent with principles of
necessity and proportionality.  Very good.  It sounds very good.  The
question is:  That there are different views again in different governments
as to where you are justified in intercepting, under what circumstances
would you be justified.  And we all know the famous Apple and FBI standoff
in the U.S.  There are similar standoffs in most countries.  And the real
question is well government says is my responsibility to keep my citizens
safe to prevent a terror attack?  And am I to go through a long and
complicated process and lose valuable time? So these are really the
dilemmas that you're addressing. And the third point is that laws should be
publicly accessible, clear, precise, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory,
openly arrived at and robust, independent mechanisms you should be in place
to ensure accountability and respect for rights. I think this is possible
to achieve, but what it means is new legislation is needed both in
individual countries as well as some common understanding of international
jurisdiction and legal frameworks that should apply across-the-board if not
to all countries, to most countries. The next point is that businesses and
other organizations that transmit and store data must assume greater
responsibility to safeguard that data from illegal intrusion, damage or
destructions. But apart from just securing the data, there's a second point
which was also one of our core concerns, which is:  There is a need to
reverse the erosion of trust in the Internet brought about by the
nontransparent market in collecting, centralising, integrating and
analyzing enormous quantities of private information about individuals and
enterprises.  How are you going to restore that trust? There is a real fear
that data mining and personal data is being used in very unethical ways, to
put it mildly, by some of the companies.  And that all of our personal data
is just "out there" and not regulated in many ways. The next point is that
it talks about government's roles, that communication should be inherently
considered private between intended parties regardless of communication's
technology. And the role of government should be strengthen the technology
and not to weaken it. So, again, there's a debate here on how many
governments would agree that it's their responsibility to strengthen
security and not the responsibility of the private sector and business.
Surely it has to be a joint effort. The next point is the encryption issue,
which is as we all know a very difficult issue.  The problem of creating
back doors to access data, I've already spoken about some of the issues.
And I think the real issue is where issues of national security,
maintaining law and order, avoiding social disruption, dealing with
Cybercrime and terror come this is where you're going to have a problem
with this one. Finally, there's one I think one which we can all agree.  We
need more cyber literacy.  We need good cyber hygiene to be spread among
all our population.  We need capacity building in cybersecurity.  This I
see as the easiest to incorporate because everybody wants this.  It's a
question of having enough resources and building it worldwide, not just in
isolated pockets of excellence. And, finally, the transported nature of
many significant forms of cyber intrusion curtails the ability of the
target state to interdict, investigate and prosecute individuals or
organizations responsible.  And that we should coordinate responses.
Different countries should coordinate responses and provide mutual
assistance. This comes down to the very important question of norms and of
MLAT reform.  Because unless you devise some norms, right now they are
nonbinding the norms that months countries have agreed to in the UNGG
recommendations.  But can they actually be implemented if they're
nonbinding?  How do you make them binding?  How do you move from nonbinding
to binding? And MLAT reform is essential.  It's too long, the process.  And
agreements could be bilateral between countries.  They could be pluri
lateral between a group of countries.  They could be regional.  They could
be multilateral.  And, finally, they could be universal and international.
The universal/international and even multilateral agreement is the hardest
to achieve.  It will also go by the lowest common denominator, so it will
yield the lowest results. So I believe we need to pursue on all fronts, the
bilateral, the regional, the pluri lateral, and, finally, the multilateral
or universal. So I hope I've left you all with some thoughts about what the
core concepts are and what our challenges are going to be.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much, ambassador.  And now if I may turn it
over to Sami Wentworth for some thoughts.  She is the Vice President of
global policy development at the Internet Society.

>> Sally:  Thank you very much.  And first I'd just like to say that the
Internet Society was -- (feedback). Is this better?  Are we good?  Oh
they're bringing me one.  Okay. The Internet Society was pleased through
Kathy Brown to participate in this work.  And I think it gives us quite a
bit of food for thought.  There's been a lot of discussion this week about
how you move from discussion to implementation.  And it's possible that
things like this kind of social compact are a good medium step to take as
we try to get to implementation of the norms and the best practices that we
all care about. One of the comments in the report that I wanted to jump off
of is a comment that in the Internet we are all interdependent.  So the
actions taken by one actor in the ecosystem have effects on other actors in
the ecosystem.  And this seems intuitive, but we often speak about how one
actor should act in isolation from how another actor should act and another
actor.  And we miss sometimes the interdependencies.  I think that's a
particularly important port that the report and the compact brings forward,
that we all have responsibilities in the ecosystem to make it a secure
place, to bring about the kind of Internet that we want and an Internet
that continues to grow and evolve. At the Internet Society, we've been
particularly focused on issues related to trust and security in the
Internet, believing fundamentally that for the Internet to continue to
grow, people have to trust it for the kinds of advanced transactions that
are starting to take place online. And no one actor is going to solve for
that, right?  It's not going to be a single government treaty that is
suddenly going to make us all secure online.  It is not going to be a
single product rollout from industry that suddenly we are all going to
trust the Internet.  And as end-users, I don't know, but many of you are
maybe as befuddled as I am about which technology or which security
protocols one should be using at any given point. So we all have a role to
play here.  And in the Internet Society, we've sort of thought about this a
bit and talked a little bit about or coined a phrase, so to speak, on how
to approach security called collaborative security.  This idea that each
actor in the ecosystem has a role to play and they have to do this in a
collaborative fashion.  Nobody does this on their own.  And that there are
some benchmarks or some principles that are worth keeping in mind as each
stakeholder group tries to take their steps forward.  Fundamentally, the
goal of security, the goal of cybersecurity action should be to foster
confidence and protect the opportunities of the Internet.  This seems,
again, intuitive and yet sometimes it's important to remember that security
is only part of the goal.  The other parts of the goal are to keep the
Internet growing and innovative.  So we can't forget that. This notion of
collective responsibility, it's not enough to say that I'm just going to
think about my own network.  Every action in your network has spillover
effects to other networks.  The Internet is an inter network.  It is a
network of networks.  So practicing good security policies within your
network is crucial for the security of the whole.  And we see that in major
breaches where you have actions by one actor having significant
consequences for others in the ecosystem. That there are fundamental
properties and values.  Fundamental Human Rights are crucial and should be
at the foremost of stakeholders' minds as you're looking to secure the
Internet.  And often, I'm afraid, that those are the very first thing to be
trampled when we delve into security.  So protecting the free flow of
information, the ability to speak freely, the ability to build communities
and to protect marginalised communities, et cetera, is a crucial aspect of
any efforts towards cybersecurity. This idea of evolution is crucial in the
Internet.  The Internet doesn't stay still.  So if you create a security
environment in which things cannot evolve, in which innovation can't
happen, you have not respected the basic fundamental properties of the
Internet.  So that means that you have to have security approaches that are
-- that allow for evolution and that allow for continued growth. That's
often harder than it sounds. And, finally, think globally, act locally.
Again, this notion that you are not alone in the ecosystem, that your
actions online have effects around the world. And so these components are
how we approach sort of quote/unquote cybersecurity or other trust-related
discussions whether it's at the technical level, the commercial level or
the political level.  And we found it to be at least a helpful tool for
thinking about online security, online trust.  And I think that it fits
nicely within this notion of a compact that we all are in this together and
we all have responsibilities to the whole.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much.  I think that might be a good transition
to Pablo Hinojosa.  I see a hand there, though.

>> I have a question from remote participant.  Do you want me to read it?

>> MODERATOR  Would you mind holding the question until a few brief
interventions and then we would love to take that question.

>> Okay, perfect.

>> MODERATOR  We'll definitely come back to that.  Thank you. So I would
like to -- we have Pablo Hinojosa, the strategic engagement director at
APNIC.  Very happy to have his brief intervention.  Thank you, Pablo.

>> Pablo:  Thank you, Laura.  First about the report, I think the work of
the commission was very good and timely.  The report is an excellent
compilation.  Let's say it explains very well the state-of-the-art, where
we are on Internet Governance discussions. However, I think we are very far
from being able to agree on a social compact.  The way at least it is
described in the report. The first question I would like to bring to the
discussion is have we ever reached a social compact?  And I think the only
process that can qualify as such is the World Summit on the Information
Society.  Is the report suggesting that it is time for another World Summit
on the Information Society?  I really, really hope not. The second
question.  How are we doing so far?  And I don't think we're doing very
well, actually.  Let's take two examples. The way things went at the ITU
the recent world telecom uncations standards assembly.  Last month in
Tunis.  And ongoing discussions, this is the second example on CSTdispvment
on enhanced communication.  We really need to revolutionize all parties
commitment to the multistakeholder model.  Some proposals contracted at the
WTSA were very consensus, in particular the ones that Member States pushed
to direct some study groups into the standards around the technology called
digital objects identifiers.  And these proposals consider abandoning
global open standards and instead suggest proprietary object identifiers. I
think there are many questions around digital objects governance
structures.  And I'm not sure they abide very well to the multistake molder
future that the report suggests and that we want to see. I want to talk of
about the enhanced, but preserving the open Internet and ensuring good
multistakeholder outcomes, for example, privacy, the Internet of Things,
also cybersecurity, as Sally said, this is a very, very big challenge. Now,
if we read social compact as something that might not need to be written,
something that we might wish for it to be absorbed rather than agreed, from
these basis, a new social compact should not require a new process. For
example, at APNIC, the place where I work, it is a regional Internet race.
We are purely technical organisation.  But since our foundation, we have
worked for a goal of Internet development in the Asia-Pacific region.  And
this didn't require social compact, but it certainly have a social
dimension, one that we have fulfilled through our technical work. What I
want to say here is that the great interest of the Internet has achieved so
much already without the need for a social compact.  For instance, the work
of APNIC has been undertaken with distinct, ethical or developmental
interest. So we think about new efforts to find such a thing, it is
important that they not have negative effects and the costs shouldn't
outweigh the real benefits. Let me finish just by saying something.  And it
is the question of how the idea of a social compact translates globally.
And let's learn by example.  How hard it was or it has been to find proper
words in Chinese, in Japanese, in Korean, even in Spanish to translate
governance, to translate multistakeholder. Here we are again dealing with a
concept that it is very of attached to the history of the modern west.
Hopes John lock, John jacks or so.  Does this social compact translate or
refers well, say, in a confusionism or do youist approach?  I don't think
so.  In conclusion, I think the report offers good recommendations with e
should all consider.  I don't think the social compact requires a new
process or an agreement.  And I think there are Internet Governance.  Such
as stewardship example.  These need to be discussed dynamically throughout
the years until a social compact that will not be achieved but it can only
be ina spired.  And I think that's the real value of the report.

>> MODERATOR  That you very much for that intervention.  We have two more
quick interventions and then I would like to open it up to discussion. If I
may call on Emilie Taylor next who is a research contributor to the global
commission on Internet Governance.  She's a regional Internet Governance
associate fellow in international security at Chatham house in the UK.
Emilie.

>> Emilie:  Thank you very much, Laura, thank you for inviting me to
participate in panel.  Like Pablo and the other speakers, Sally, I think
that the global commission report -- and I can say this having not been
involved in writing it but as part of the research team -- I think that the
report is a very important piece of work.  Thank you. And it does reflect
the state-of-the-art and the state of thinking at this thinking and the
concerns. What particularly struck me about it as really sensible is this
sort of scenario-based thinking on what could happen in the future of the
Internet.  It could be a colossal loss of trust, ram panned Cybercrime,
breaking up into fragmented, according to national borders.  An Internet
that none of us would want. And at the end of the spectrum, this rosy
future where we really harness the capability of the' net to do good and to
help the environment, the Internet of Things had really take off in a
positive way. And then this sort of middle course which is one of, you
know, muddling through, but stunted growth or perhaps, you know, just lack
of realising that potential. And I think these scenarios are sensible
because they recognize that there are different futures that we could have
and that also it's up to us to try to shape, to decide what sort of future
we want and to do a little bit to help it. Now, I think many of us were in
the session the other day where somebody sort of mentioned -- and it was
quite funny, the sort of well, this is a great report, all these great
minds.  And really it boils down to why can't everybody just cooperate a
bit more?  And that got a laugh.  And I laughed, as well.  But it made me
feel a bit uneasy because what we're advocating is as Pablo said is in
short supply at the moment.  I think we're all our confidence shaz been
shaken by a series of unfortunate events or shocks, you know, going back to
the Snowden revelations, increasing cyber attacks.  Those of us in the
United Kingdom or perhaps the United States, we might be worried at the
moment about what this new medium is doing to our democracies and whether
that's having a positive effect. You know, it's hard to know that to do.
It's hard to solve these problems. I think that it reminds me of that
saying by Churchill of when you're going through hell, keep going. And I
think we have to keep going with our positive local actions.  And so from
the point of view of Chatham House in terms of what we're doing to take the
work forward, we have developed a new peer review journal called the
journal of cyber policy.  And that is hoping to take the discussion forward
to reflect, to sit at the intersection of all of these different
overlapping policy issues and try to just raise awareness.  What we're
seeing is that people from different disciplines are becoming increasingly
interested in this area and they're looking for information about it.  They
also have a lot to contribute from other perspectives and other walks of
life. I think the other thing that I think perhaps is uncomfortable -- and
this is my final point -- about from those of us, like Sally and myself or
Pablo who have been in this space for quite a while is a growing
realisation that actually states do have a role in terms of making a fair
future both in balancing the power of an increasingly small number of very
powerful private sector organizations who almost exercise the powers of
states, it seems, in some ways.  And there's an important need for that
power to be counteracted for the Human Rights obligations of states to be
upheld and for us to, you know, keep speaking truth to power wherever that
power happens to lie.  It might lie in new places like companies, for
example, rather than states.  And we just have to keep the dialogue going
and keep advocating a fair and non-radical future.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much, Emilie.  Now if I could call on
ambassador Eileen done an hoe who is also a fellow.  She was part of the
global commission on Internet Governance and needs no introduction.  Former
United States ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council and
former director of the global affairs for Human Rights Watch.  So what are
the Human Rights implications of all of this?

>> There are many.  And it's incredibly consequential.  I just want to pick
up on themes that were already mentioned because I think the previous
speakers hit what's really important.  In particular, Latha, it's one thing
the say what we want, it's another thing how we get there, whether it is
protection of Human Rights or protecting the Internet or how do we get a
social compact?  That's of easier to say than to do. Sally, I thought your
emphasis on the concept of collaborative security is a really interesting
move that I think we have to make and to be thinking about the whole.  We
all have some response about it to the whole and this sense of
interdependence. And then Pablo and Emilie, you both sort of, you said we
got to move through hell.  Where are we in this process?  We are in a very
difficult space.  And we've got to get through it. You emphasized the dual
sidedness of the technology.  There was an optimistic moment when we all
thought it was going to be great for Human Rights.  Now we're feeling so
negatively about it.  It's almost like we're retreating from the technology
itself.  And we have to get past that. So I'm just going to make a couple
quick comments, more focused on the Human Rights dimensions. You know,
obviously the Internet and the concept of universal Human Rights, they in
some ways go so well together.  The universal Human Rights framework was in
some ways the first global set of norms.  And it was almost the founders of
the universal declaration, they were almost prescient in coming up with
that notion. We know that we've went through a phase where the flourishing
of Human Rights, Freedom of Expression, freedom of assembly and
association, there was a time when Human Rights defenders were really ahead
of the curve and we felt really good about it. We know that all of -- the
three pillars of the UN are all completely interdependent with technology
now.  The Sustainable Development Goals, norms on use of force is connected
to cyber technology, and then the enjoyment of Human Rights.  We basically
cannot conceive of the enjoyment of Human Rights without ICT.  And that
goes for the people who are not yet connected, more than half the world.
We have to be thinking about their enjoyment of Human Rights through the
expansion of technology at the same time we're trying to figure out how to
protect people from the technology. Where are we now?  I think we are, as
several of you have said, we're at a tough moment because the fear of
systemic cyber vulnerability and society-wide digital insecurity is
overwhelming people in many different walks of life.  And that is combining
with the conceptual confusion of how do we think about governance in this
space? There is few dimensions that particularly challenge the original
Human Rights framework itself.  So digitisation of everything.  It's got
many upside benefits.  But obviously it presents a serious threat to
privacy, which in turn presents a threat to Freedom of Expression, freedom
of assembly and association.  It also raises challenges about how do we
think bid at this, ownership -- about identity.  Is the government watching
the people?  And then digitisation has played into this sense of deep
digital insecurity. The second part of the conceptual challenge of the
digital eco system is the fact that extra-territorial reach is the norm,
not the exception.  And the original framework envisioned nation states
with primary obligation to citizens within their territory and boundary.
And now they are somewhat powerless to protect people.  And they also, by
the way, have extra-territorial reach themselves. And the last piece of the
conceptual puzzle is this trend toward privatization of governance.  Again,
the Human Rights framework does not really directly address the private
sector.  And yet they are by Terms of Service or community guidelines or
just plain ownership operation and securityisation of the infrastructure
itself playing a dominant role in governance. So, I will just make a couple
of slightly more optimistic points, which is I do think there's something
we all need to push on in the multistakeholder model because we don't have
many good examples of it, but I think we can sense there is something there
we need to learn from.  And we've moved way past this concept of
governments having a monopoly on governance.  That's over.  I think we're
all dissatisfied with the dual relationship between governments and private
sector and the burden shifting from governments to the private sector and
the lack of transparency and accountability.  That's not going to cut it,
either. However difficult it is, this multistakeholder concept will get to
the sense of greater inclusion and diversity, and it will help build
legitimacy and trust.  I know it's time consuming, frustrating.  It's an
ugly thing sometimes.  But I think it's the only way through hell, as
Emilie said. I also think we need real paradigm shifts society wide on
digital security.  I think we need to turn it on its head and stop seeing
security as opposition to Human Rights.  Security is the most fundamental
Human Rights issue of our time.  Digital security.  Human Rights defenders'
lives depend upon it.  It's not just nice to have.  It's basic.  It's so
fundamental to the Human Rights movement.  It's also happens to be
fundamental to economic security and national security.  So that I think
there's opportunity for new alliances. And then last, Latha, you raised
this issue of how do we implement our existing Human Rights commitments in
this transborder environment?  I don't think we know the answer, but I
think one clue is to have some humility about the assertion of the
jurisdiction extra-territorially.  And at least embrace the concept of "do
no arm." If you're going to claim of doing something in the security of
your people or protection of Human Rights of your people and people
elsewhere are affected but experience it as undermining their Human Rights,
that's not your space.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much.  I think at this point we'll open it up
for a discussion.  Shall we start with my friend -- okay.  We have, thank
you.  Let's start with the question from the remote moderation if we may.
Would you mind saying that one important time with the microphone? And just
a little bit slower, too.

>> The question is:  Before NSA or SDI, how could we forbid a website from
collecting a private data unless it's allowed by a specific law?

>> MODERATOR  That's very specific.  Let's hear from Alex and let's take a
number of questions and then we'll respond.

>> Law, Laura, this is Alexander Pisanty from the Internet Society in
Mexico.  I will repeat.  This isle Alejandro Pisanty from the Internet
Society in Mexico.  Thank you, Laura and the global commission for putting
forward this report.  This is an amazing piece of work in so many ways.  It
brings together strands of thought that are around that brings them
together in a structure and then intelligent way.  It looks at ways
forward. I am not going to say anything specific to points in the report
right now, but more like a global view derived from the reading.  And the
reactions that it is sparking comments and questions that are already
around. First, I think that one has to be very careful in going forward in
presenting things in such a way that spark the delusion of one world
government.  The idea that there could be one single global uniform social
compact for the Internet or for cyberspace or for whatever is easily
associated in many people's minds with the idea of a single way of doing
things, a single place to concentrate and a single legislature and a single
judiciary power.  And then you would have to have a single executive power
because you can't have two without having three. And this is a very
dangerous delusion because it will never happen.  And it won't be built by
the liberation. The report suggests a single social compact.  And I think
that's an pipe dream.  That's not a goal that people should have. In
conversations about four or five years ago with Paul Tumi, which I think
then fed into the work of the Commission, I mentioned to him that my
wording was a new social covenant about the things that happened around the
Internet and it starts with very basic likal not etiquette kind of
relationships and agreements.  Like what is it right to do if you see a
picture of your classmates who are very drunk on the beach? We already have
a Rule for that.  If you saw somewhere your classmates in a very improper
position, you would be expected to do something and not to do something
else.  And we have to change that because of the way the Internet has
changed the memory of these things.  And this goes all the way to the big
social compact.  Pablo has well mentioned western concept of the social
contracts. But it leaves aside layers in which these things happen.  You
have one contract that you need for the physical layer, communications
layer and it's going to be very difficult when you begin to think what hate
is, what freedom is. I take an phrase from spam analysis where we say one
man's spam is another man's -- one man's freedom is another man's threat.
One man's struggle for freedom is seen as extremely threatening to other
cultures. So it's hard again to build a single social compact around these
concepts.  And they have to go layer by layer.  Or some layers have better
defined stuff and some have to be very diffuse and vague. Mixing, we have
heard during this meeting, not this particular session but during this
meeting of the IGF calls for the correct use of the Internet which are --
calls for responsible use of the Internet which still I find -- I do feel
-- there's an association for proper Internet Governance.  All these
objectives.  So low that need definitions.  And we should not feed any of
these things by the reading and diffusion of the report because it would
lose its value. It's important to keep things dynamic to remember how the
Internet works, to remember how the Internet is decentralised, diverse, how
Internet Governance has been built around solving specific problems by
bringing the specific large number, broad number of stakeholders but I will
say it with examples of imaginary companies.  If you have a content company
and net work company, if they are going to discuss spam, they will bring in
the engineers.  If they will discuss intellectual properties they will
bring the lawyers.  It's the same entities making the agreements. So the
final point I would like to make is to emphasize that as we are looking at
the problems the report looks at and time has been passing, we're looking
less and less at problems of the Internet than at problems of conduct that
display or execute over the Internet.  By being displayed or executed over
the Internet, conduct becomes massified, it becomes easier to objectify, to
cross jurisdictions and as a consequence you have reduction of freedom,
friction, and lowering of barriers.  That's what happens.  Essentially
that's what happens to conduct, human or corporate or governmental with the
Internet. We have to focus on the conduct have we have to focus on the
motivations.  We have to focus on the objectives of the humans or
corporations or governments that are creating this conduct and then
separate what the compact will be properly about.  Thank you.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much.  And I think it's a good time to
probably make clear that the report is not calling for one government
entity or one judiciary.  It actually is something that disaggregates this
dialogue about Internet Governance as one thing into many different parts.
So it actually disaggregates and talks about specific areas.  And it's a
very strong statement of support for the multistakeholder approach to
Internet Governance.  So I thought I would just mention that.  No one is
calling for another WSIS, either.  But I just wanted to say that so that
people didn't have the idea that there was a call for anything like that in
the report.  But thank you very much. And how about a comment from right
here.  If you wouldn't mind stating your name for folks.

>> Hi, Jeremy Malcolm here from Electronic Frontier Foundation and I want
to respond to Alejandro's remarks and also to Pablo's in some way. So the
report is very coy about what sort of process or institution might guide or
host the construction of a new social contract for the Internet.  And Pablo
suggested that it might sort of be some kind of emergent property of the
status quo whereas Alejandro is saying we can't aspire towards a broad
social compact.  We have to have a multitude of different --

>> I'd really like you to imot me accurately.

>> Anyway, we all just heard what you said, we don't need to repeat it.
But it doesn't seem realistic to me that we can achieve the outcomes that
the report is terming as a new social contract if we don't be a little more
proactive about it.  Even the IGF, after 11 years, hasn't come up with a
single recommendation.  And meanwhile as the report points out, Internet
roles are being developed in fora such as trade agreements.  These are
intended to be all encompassing in the nature of a concept.  We're saying
we can't do this because it's incompatible with Confucian can cultures, and
yet it's happening in trade agreements.  If we want to counteract and and
be more multistakeholder how we address trees problems, we have to do
things like at the one meeting where we did come up with a broad compact.
It wasn't universal.  It didn't cover all issues.  But perhaps, I mean the
report does recommend the continuity of the IGF.  And that has happened.
But can't we do more to actually facilitate the development of a new social
contract in a way, I MENA lay Hahn DROIand said it's kind of impossible to
do what Mondale actually did.  Can't we be a bit more ambitious?  So that's
my question.

>> Alejandro:  I'm glad you have the privilege to reinterpret creatively
what the previous speakers say.  Thank you.

>> MODERATOR  There's hand down at the end of the table and then one here.
Let's take those there.  Starting at the end of the table, there's some
mics down there, too.  And if you could please state your name that would
be fantastic.

>> Hi, my name is -- and I'm from the -- IGF programme of ISOC.  So my
question is regarding a lot of the agreements and compacts and covenants
that are happening round the world right now, one of the problems is that
the binding issue is a real problem to enforce such compacts and such
agreements around the world and throughout cultures and throughout
religions and everything. So my question is about in the report, what are
the proposals and what are you proposing to enforce?  Cohesive covenant
that is binding to all of the signing parts?  And what are the
possibilities of these to actually happening in the real world?  Thank you.

>> So I maybe just will weigh in.  I wasn't on the commission, but I think
the emphasis or the desire to go straight to implementation and we need a
single mechanism or a formal this or formal that, I guess the way I looked
at this was there's a nice list in here of some core elements of this
compact, whatever you want to call it.  We don't like that mic.  Okay.
It's a way of doing things. It's an a way of approaching issues.  And I
think the way I was thinking of it is if we say in here the Commission has
said that interception of the communications, this is something the
ambassador raised, this should be necessary and proportionate.  So there's
some basic principles in here.  You don't then have to go immediately and
codify that.  But rather think of it as a way of doing business, as a way
of trying to move forward on problem solving. If we immediately have to
take everything into a treaty or into a single implementation mechanism,
then we challenge I think the point that I was making was you got to allow
things to evolve and grow.  These are some basic norms or concepts that
should help guide our thinking as we try to solve these problems.

>> MODERATOR  Thanks, Sally.  And Emilie as a quick two finger intervention
and then we have a comment here and at the end of the table.

>> Sally:  Sorry.  I'll be brief.  Really to support your point, Sally. I
hadn't read.  It's become clear to me listening to others that people are
reading the report in different ways.  Well there's a surprise.  Of course
people are. I had also seen it as almost like a strategic framework.  And I
think this is reflected in the final lines of the report which says "we
reiterate the value of approaching Internet-related issues within a
conceptual framework of the global/social compact.  It is not a world where
any one group can unilaterally make or impose decisions no matter if it is
as powerful as the nation state." So I didn't see the report as advocating
a particular solution or of doing a power grab but just of projecting
different futures that might occur and encouraging us to think about our
own role in really trying to help shape a positive future for the Internet
because it is possible to do that.  It is also possible to make a choice to
take no action and just allow technical determine any many to just take its
course. Determinism.

>> All right.  This seems to work.  Yes?  Yes.  Okay. The first thing --
oh, I'm sorry.  I'm garland McCoy with technology education institute. And
first thing I'd like to put on the table is that governments lie.  They
violate their own laws.  The private sector lies.  Of course they don't
have any laws to really violate.  But there's a real trust issue that goes
really at the core of all this. I sit here in a session or two back and
this guy was saying "well, in Brazil they have a law against depack and
inspection." I said that's great.  That means you don't have an Internet in
Brazil.  What do you mean?  Well then you have depack inspection because
that's how you find the anomalies.  That's how you weed out your malware.
In other words, they just constantly getting caught on their own lies.  The
right to be forgotten.  It's garbage.  Anybody knows how the thing works.
So you got a huge trust issue you have to deal with. The other problem that
I see looming on the horizon is the fact that you're going to end up with
only a few governments and only a few companies that will have both the
financial wherewithal, the technological wherewithal, and most importantly
the power, electricity, that will be needed in quantum computers to crack
any code.  So they'll be the preeminent guardians of security, if you will,
in the fact that they alone will be able to put enough just plain force
behind getting any code you possibly can write.  Because eventually you can
krk anything.  You just have to keep piling enough computing power which
requires enough electricity on the issue. So one is trust, the other is
security, which then translates back into power.  So you'll have these
power kings at the top of the pyramid. One of the things that I thought
might be something to look at that I had a hand in setting up is the
broadband Internet technical advisory group, what they call BTAG.  The
reason I sort of like this molded with the multistakeholder structure is at
some point you really do need to have some trusted, impartial group sort of
like the MPAA found very early on they needed to have some way of firewall
protecting the folks that were going to rate the movies.  And since that
was a very important thing that would go to the bottom line of the studios,
they had to really firewall these guys out.  Their ruling was law. You have
to have some way to hold these, both sides, the two big boys, if you will,
hold their feet to the fire.  Show the lies for what they are.  Keep
flashing the light back in their face for two reasons, one on the private
sector side, they don't want to lose customers.  They live on the
customers.  They get the customers start not trusting them, then they learn
about the dirty dealings, they'll walk. Second on the government side, not
all governments, but at least the ones that have some sort of democratic
elections, same thing, you lie to them once too often, they say okay,
you're not getting re-elected. So if we could form some sort of trusted
core, surround it with the kind of stakeholders on both sides that will
keep that, protect that core element there, keep it trustworthy and give it
the power and authority to keep shining that light, keep being the truth
teller regardless of what side we're working with, then maybe the next step
will become a little bit more obvious than it is to me right now.  That's
it.  Thanks.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you.  The gentleman at the end of the table. There's a
mic for you.

>> Does this work?  Yes.  I'm Thomas.  I'm the ambassador for cyber foreign
policy at the German general foreign office.  I wanted to react to the
criticism that was addressed to the drafters or to the report as such. I
didn't read it that way, that this would be a document that governments or
stakeholders should sign up to and that was it.  What I liked about the
report was that for the first time, a group of experts like this actually
challenges us saying:  We are at a point where people may no longer trust
the Internet.  And they may be withdrawing from it.  Because so far all the
narratives where it gets better.  We inyou had the next # billion and
everything goes up and forward. . You for the first time say we are at an
important point it may not be the case.  Then you come up with these three
scenarios which I think is very useful.  One is really scary.  The middle
one is probably what we have and the other one is maybe too rosy but it's
nice to think in alternatives.  So in that sense, and then you come up with
these recommendations.  Which, let's put it this bay way.  Well meaning
democratically controlled government that is not lying.  My government
doesn't lie at least not flightily in the face of people in the room --
flatly. Government that is aware of its responsibility.  And users who want
to defend and preserve freedom and liberty of the Internet, these groups,
stakeholders as we call them, that could be their vision, in a way, the
renewed sense of purpose.  This is what the report contains in my view.
That's how I read it and in that sense I'm very grateful to the authors.
It's a good thing piece and makes us step back and think again.  Thank you.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you.  Latha, feel free.

>> LATHA:  I just wanted to say that if you read the introduction to the
report carefully, you would see that we very clearly stated that in writing
this report, the GCIG is we, we believe, providing practical advice on the
steps everyone needs to take to achieve a positive, creative outcome. So it
was never meant to be that we have the solution.  It was simply outlining
the problems.  And as you said, the three possible scenarios.  The danger
is broken, cyberspace, the unequal gains and, finally, the wonderful utopia
of the broad, unprecedented progress is I think what we called it. And I
agree with you.  I think we're at the uneven and unequal gains but with the
very real threat of the dangerous and broken cyberspace if we don't act
now.

>> MODERATOR  Do we have any remote moderation questions that have come in?
Okay.  Any other thoughts from the room?  Yes.  At the end of the table.

>> Good afternoon.  I'm Michael.  I'm a bit like Thomas have I'm the cyber
foreign policy for the foreign ministry of Canada. We were pleased to
support the work of the commission.  We were there at the early days and
some of the early discussions about the Commission.  And we've been
assisting the Commission in transmitting the results of its report.  And
we've been very pleased to do that. A bit like Thomas, we find the report
to be a very useful assessment of the current situation.  It portrays some
different possibilities for the future.  And I think as Latha has suggested
it does make some concrete recommendations about moving forward. But I did
want to speak a little bit about the social compact.  In my view, in my
reading of the report, the social compact is not meant to be something
that's negotiated and adopted and written down and cast in stone; rather,
it's a conceptual framework.  It's what we should all be thinking about
when we think about how we tackle these problems. And I think that the key
part of that social compact, the proposal there, is the idea that we've got
to stop looking at this as a zero sum game where one person wins and
another person loses, that really what we need to do is stop and think
about how do we all gain the benefits that are available to us if we can
solve this problem?  And I think that that is a very salient point and one
that we should keep in mind as we go forward. But I wouldn't want to
underestimate the difficulty of that because as some commenters had
suggested, there are -- this is a complicated world.  Issues like
multistakeholderism are not universally accepted.  States are powerful.
States do operate in this space.  And states reject the notion, some states
reject the notion of multistakeholderism. I've had the questionable
pleasure of being involved in negotiations in UN General Assembly at WSIS
and elsewhere.  And reference has been made to met mundial, which I think
was considered by many an enormous success.  And yet we have states that
block every effort to even refer to it in a resolution. So. So let's please
not underestimate the difficulties that we face.  But I think in a way the
report tries to address that, as well because I think it suggests that in
approaching this intellectual or conceptual framework that's exemplified by
the compact, it points out the way that I think we need to engage with
those other actors, as well, to try to turn it away from zero sum game and
into one where we all benefit, taking into account all the various
interests of every one there.  So thank you very much for the report.

>> MODERATOR  Thank you very much.  Alejandro?

>> ALEJANDRO PISANTY:  I will try the unfriendly microphone.  That's where
it stops working. So I would like to insist that I appreciate the report
very highly.  I was able to read most of the report that the Commission was
producing, so it's a pleasant conclusion.  It's a capping.  A very worthy
capping stone to the effort. It's unfortunately, let me make this more
direct.  I am not referring to, as I said, to that report as saying that
there will be a single world government or other the things that I
mentioned.  I said I perceived readings of it that are possible in that
way.  In fact, I found parts of the presentation of Ambassador Reddy that
already resonated with the views that we in turn look for global
agreements, treaties and so forth. I think we are in the best of cases very
far from all encompassing treaties that could really deal with the whole of
cyber or the whole of Internet Governance.  There is value in the work of
the traditional international relations point of view of aiming at treaties
or multilateral agreements.  But definitely multilateral will only cover
the government part of the problem in the best of cases.  It may become
irrelevant by not covering the rest.  But again these are echoes and
resonances from the reading of the report. About the effort that went into
NETmundial which called for the ratification of some of the views of the
report, there is amazingly for some YMMD your mileage may vary.  Some of us
perceive that the top-down politically motivated very substantial and time-
driven, deadline-driven process of NETmundial induced some flaws in the
process.  They don't kill it.  They don't reduce the value that it does
have.  It does put a cap on that value and the value as example.  Plus the
fact that the report has been decoupled from the initiative.  And the
initiative, the NETmundial initiative has faded away tells you again that
these one-time efforts that are not completely organic are again only part
of what you need. That's the way forward that I think. I think that we have
to again realise also the IGF has produced very little resolutions.  In
fact, it will be half fulfilled its mission if it has as its principles if
it produces no resolutions and recommendations that can be implemented
elsewhere.  If it produces a resolution or recommendation on spectrum,
it'll be duplicating the ITU's work.  If it produces a recommendation on
freedom of speech or on linguistic diversity, it will be invading UNESCO
territory and so forth. These are the boundaries that you have to look at
when we try honestly to build something like a social compact or moving
pieces that will eventually lead to an assembly of come tax that actually
work instead of a single one that you don't achieve.

>> MODERATOR  So just trying to be a bit optimistic and think of the
opportunities for how we use this work going forward, if we look forward to
2017, I know my German colleague is here, there's the G20 meeting that
Germany is hosting, the G7 that Italy is hosting.  These are government
meetings.  But hopefully with multistakeholder components.  And some of the
specificity that comes through these principles when coupled with what
comes out of WSIS, what comes out of other venues could be a nice basis for
some of that work. And we see some opportunities to move this forward in
those venues.  Those are government venues.  But there are others.  There's
work being done on jurisdiction where these kinds of principles can be
useful.  That is not government-driven but that is -- has some policy
implications. Many of my community live in the technical world.  And
looking at an understanding that the protocols that we develop have
implications for real people and that there are some requirements on
privacy and security that need to be taken into account. So I think again
rather than looking at this in the singular, we look at how we utilize
these principles.  And what I like that comes out of here is it seems to
take it to the next level.  So we've had some high-level statements.  Now
we get a little bit more specificity and we start to use these principles
to shape the policy frameworks that are emerging in the opportunity space
that we see before us. So 2017 has these G7, G20.  The next year will have
something else.  And we keep moving and building on this.  So from this
perspective we found this to be quite helpful.

>> MODERATOR  Well that's actually a great place to stop is sessiony want
to thank everyone for coming and for providing such feedback.  It has been
really interesting over the last 10 years to watch Internet Governance,
just thinking back to the 2006 Athens IGF.  A decade before that even
watching it go from being interesting only to those of us who are
technologists and academics and a certain subset of policymakers to being
so high on the agenda of all governments and talked about in the same vein
as poverty and human security and climate change and other kinds of global
collective action problems. So I appreciate very much the opportunity to
share some of the information about the report and thank everyone who had
interventions. If anyone would like a copy of the report, that's a hard
copy, there are some floating around the room and I hope you'll just take
them. And I want to reiterate that the 50 research papers, the poll
information, the report and also this specific document toward a social
compact for dinl teal privacy and security, are all available on the
website ourinternet.  So thank you so much for coming and enjoy the rest of
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